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(	 ھعبار 	 نارتخد )	have	expressed	concern	about	the	exclusion	of	women	and	civil	society	in	“peace	
 
103	Shivji,	Silences	in	NGO	discourse,	21	and	56.	
104	Nkrumah,	Neo-Colonialism,	239.	
105	Wallerstein,	European	Universalism	;	Gentry	and	Sjoberg,	Beyond	Mothers,	Monsters,	Whores	;		Kazi,	Islamophobia,	Race,	
and	Global	Politics,	79.	
106	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“A	Foreign	Policy	In	Service	to	Our	Veterans.”	
107	Kazi,	Islamophobia,	Race,	and	Global	Politics,	90	and	Turse,	The	Changing	Face	of	Empire,	26.	
108	Akrami,	Halaimzai,	and	Sidiqi,	“Afghanistan	deal:	Don’t	trade	away	women’s	rights	to	the	Taliban.	Put	us	at	the	table”	
and	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“Department	Press	Briefing	–	August	8,	2019.”	
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agreements”	and	“intra-Afghan	dialogue”	which	risks	perpetuating	patriarchy	and	U.S.	
militarism.109		
The	U.S.	state	has	increased	its	use	of	aerial	strikes	and	drone	operations,	causing	a	
considerable	amount	of	death	and	destruction	to	local	Afghan	populations.	Under	Trump,	the	U.S.	
escalated	the	use	of	violence.	This	administration	authorized	an	additional	4,000	ground	troops,	
increased	targeted	airstrikes,	relaxed	rules	of	engagement,	and	granted	his	military	officials	in	
Afghanistan	and	the	CIA	“total	authorization”	“to	target	the	terrorists	and	criminal	networks	that	
sow	violence	and	chaos	throughout	Afghanistan.”110	The	military	increasingly	relies	on	aerial	tactics	
and	targeted	killings	from	jets	and	unmanned	drones.	In	2015,	the	Bureau	of	Investigative	
Journalism	began	recording	U.S.	drone	and	jet	strikes	by	U.S.	Air	Force	Central	Command	of	Central	
Command	(CENTCOM).	Since	2015,	the	Bureau	recorded	over	13,000	confirmed	strikes,	killing	
from	4,126	to	10,076	Afghan	citizens.111	The	U.	S.	deploys	MQ-1	Predator	and	MQ-9	Reaper	drones	
to	minimize	risk	to	U.S.	personnel	and	maximize	“intelligence,	surveillance,	and	reconnaissance”	
operations.112	Many	drone	operations	are	also	conducted	in	secrecy	by	the	CIA,	making	accurate	
and	comprehensive	data	surrounding	the	civilian	impact	of	drone	strikes	difficult	to	obtain	and	
official	figures	considerably	low.	Yet,	none	of	these	figures	are	memorialized	in	any	document	
within	the	archives.	Instead,	these	realities	are	omitted	in	favor	of	the	sanitization	of	U.S.	imperial	
archives	of	foreign	policy	and	representation	of	Afghanistan	as	a	violent	threat.		
U.S.	foreign	policy	documents	function	as	an	integral	part	of	U.S.	empire-building	through	
the	production	of	regime-made	disasters.	These	documents	become	representations	of	the	
supposed	“reality”	of	the	relationship	between	the	U.S.	and	Afghanistan.	This	relationship	is	
represented	as	grounded	in	discourses	of	danger	and	humanitarianism	that	construct	Afghanistan	
 
109	Laly,	“The	United	States-Taliban	Peace	Deal	and	the	Perpetuation	of	Patriarchy.”		
110	Niva,	“Trump’s	Drone	Surge.”		
111	The	Bureau	of	Investigative	Journalism,	“Strikes	in	Afghanistan.”		
112	Sadat,	“America’s	Drone	Wars,”	218-219	and	The	Bureau	of	Investigative	Journalism,	“Afghanistan:	US	air	and	drone	
strikes,	2015	–	present.”		
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as	a	hyper-visible	regime-made	disaster,	a	problem	for	the	U.S.	to	save,	modernize,	and	manage.	The	
production	of	spaces,	particularly	geopolitically	strategic	spaces,	as	regime-made	disasters	
underpin	U.S.	empire-building	and	fit	perfectly	into	the	international	world	order	based	on	the	
construction	of	unequal	and	exploitative	relations.	The	category	of	“regime-made	disaster”	allows	
analysts	to	see	how	the	U.S.	begins	to	construct	imperial	relations	and	how	this	is	intimately	
connected	to	conquest,	capitalist	exploitation,	and	the	“proliferation	of	modern	nation-states.”113	
	 	
 
113	Azoulay,	Potential	History,	362.		
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CHAPTER	II:	U.S.	Pointillism	and	the	Imperial	World	Order	
	
	
	 This	chapter	analyzes	how	the	construction	of	Afghanistan	as	a	regime-made	disaster	fits	
into	U.S.	empire-building	and	the	maintenance	of	the	imperial	world	order.	The	documents	uncover	
how	those	within	these	three	administrations	framed	the	relationship	between	the	U.S.	and	
Afghanistan	as	a	“partnership”	to	securitize	and	“reconstruct”	the	Afghan	state.	This	representation	
masks	the	unequal	integration	of	Afghanistan	into	the	international	imperial	world	order	and	
obscures	ongoing	U.S.	imperial	violence	through	the	construction	and	surveillance	of	regime-made	
disasters	as	nation-state	enclaves	for	the	benefit	of	the	U.S.	imperial	core.	This	process	occurs	
within	an	international	world	order	reliant	on	the	establishment	of	a	global	nation-state	system	to	
perpetuate	the	imperial	condition.	The	documents	in	these	archives	expose	how	U.S.	leadership	and	
spokespeople	facilitate	the	integration	of	the	U.S.	state	and	its	citizens	into	the	international	world	
order	as	above	and	outside	“realm	of	imperial	accountability.”114	
	
	
The	Imperial	World	Order	and	Nation-State	Enclaves		
	
	
The	term	“Imperialism”	entered	popular	vernacular	in	the	late	19th	century	as	
industrializing	European	nations	intensified	their	scramble	to	acquire	colonies,	strategic	alliances,	
and	spheres	of	influence.	Liberal	critics,	such	as	John	Hobson,	connected	Imperialism	to	the	
development	of	finance	capitalism	but	focused	their	efforts	on	the	revision	of	imperial	and	colonial	
policies	to	retain	imperial	control	from	European	powers.115	Early	European	socialists	made	
economic-based	arguments	but	through	a	more	revolutionary	framework.	They	emphasized	how	
domestic	underproduction	and	protectionist	policies	to	insulate	domestic	markets	led	to	finance-
 
114	Azoulay,	Potential	History,	554.		
115	See	Hobson,	Imperialism:	A	Study.	Hobson	remained	fully	invested	in	imperial	ideologies,	claiming	that	“civilized”	
nations	should	retain	political	and	economic	control	over	their	territories	to	protect	local	populations	and	ensure	the	
spread	of	progress	and	preventing	the	abandonment	of	“the	backward	races	to	these	perils	of	private	exploitation.”	(pg.	
244).	See	also	Getachew,	Worldmaking	after	Empire,	82	and	Smith,	Decolonizing	Methodologies,	21.	
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capital-driven	imperial	expansion	for	new	markets	and	outlets	for	overproduction.	Vladimir	Lenin	
described	this	new	“monopoly/finance	imperialism”	as	the	“latest	stage	of	capitalism”	
characterized	by	the	pursuit	of	emerging	capitalist	nations,	such	as	Germany	and	the	United	States,	
to	re-organize	colonial	divisions	to	their	advantage.116	Early	European	socialists	remained	
committed	to	the	conceptualization	of	Imperialism	in	terms	of	a	linear	temporality.	They	viewed	
Imperialism	as	a	fixed	stage	of	capitalism	that	would	eventually	produce	its	own	demise	as	
militarized	national	economies	attempt	to	obtain	lucrative	globally	dispersed	raw	materials	and	
open	markets.117	While	early	theorists	of	Imperialism	established	an	important	connection	between	
imperial	and	colonial	projects,	uneven	development,	and	the	expansion	of	(finance)	capitalism,	they	
failed	to	account	for	the	flexibility	and	adaptability	of	imperial	enterprise	to	changing	world	
conditions.		
Uneven	development	and	incorporation	into	international	institutions	and	markets	remains	
a	signature	of	ongoing	forms	of	imperial	enterprise	and	neocolonial	oppression.	Nkrumah	coined	
the	term	“Neocolonialism”	to	outline	how	imperial	actors	continue	to	engage	in	imperial	and	
colonial	politics	and	relations	as	they	“seek	the	domination	of	the	world	for	the	imperialism	they	
serve.”118	Neocolonialism	can	take	many	forms,	from	counseling	to	military	assistance	to	advice	and	
“aid	schemes”	to	efforts	by	international	capitalists	to	ensure	that	imperial	powers	maintain	control	
and	influence.119	Imperial	agents,	driven	by	the	logic	of	capitalism,	strive	for	the	underdevelopment	
of	newly	independent	states	in	previously	colonized	areas	through	the	development	of	an	
international	division	of	labor	within	a	modern	transnational	capitalist	system.120	Imperial	actors	
 
116	Lenin	and	Bukharin,	Imperialism	and	War,	37-48.	
117	Ibid.	See	also	Luxemburg,	The	Accumulation	of	Capital.	Luxemburg’s	theory	of	the	demise	of	Imperialism	was	a	bit	
different,	as	she	argued	that	the	process	of	colonizing	non-capitalist	economies	becomes	a	self-destructive	contradiction	
that	leads	to	the	fall	of	the	capitalist	system.		
118	Nkrumah,	Neo-Colonialism,	30.		
119	Ibid,	31-36.		
120	Amin,	“The	New	Imperialist	Structure.”	Amin	argues	that	this	“logic	of	the	capitalist	system”	consistently	transforms	its	
modes	of	operation	to	maintain	North-South	and	center-periphery	polarization	and		describes	capitalism	and	
“Imperialism”	as	“two	inseparable	forces	of	the	same	reality.”	See	also	more	on	World	Systems	Theory	in	Getachew,	
Worldmaking	after	Empire,	149	and	Wallerstein,	World-Systems	Analysis:	An	Introduction,	58-59	and	98-100.		
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maintain	exploitative	and	politically	advantageous	relationships	between	the	imperial	state	and	
pseudo-independent	states	to	ensure	the	continuation	of	imperial	enterprise.	Hence,	what	imperial	
forces	represent	as	reciprocal,	unified	processes	of	global	interconnection	and	trade	manifests	as	
“point-to-point	connectivity”	to	connect	securitized,	economically	strategic	enclaves	into	complex	
networks	that	reinforce	capitalist	divisions	of	labor	and	neocolonial	exploitation.121	
The	development	of	an	international	system	comprised	of	discrete	“nation-state”	units	is	a	
hallmark	of	the	imperial	world	order.	From	1917	to	1919,	growing	calls	of	resistance	inside	and	
outside	of	Europe	built	the	foundation	for	global	revolution.	Colonized	populations	began	to	resist	
imperial	domination	with	ideas	of	“self-determination”	and	“independence.”122	Imperial	actors	
quickly	and	successfully	transformed	efforts	to	advance	anti-colonial	worldmaking	into	the	
institutionalization	of	empire.	With	the	establishment	of	the	League	of	Nations,	Woodrow	Wilson	
reappropriated	the	language	of	“self-determination”	in	service	of	the	maintenance	of	Empire.	Newly	
established	nations,	such	as	Ethiopia	and	Liberia,	were	only	welcomed	into	the	League	of	Nations	
with	“special	obligations”	and	systems	of	oversight	“designed	to	discipline	and	civilize.”123	Early	
international	institutions	transformed	the	threat	of	decolonization	to	unequal	integration	into	
international	institutions	designed	to	preserve	a	racially	differential	principle	compatible	with	
imperial	enterprise.124	
Black	revolutionaries	during	the	1930s	sought	to	reappropriate	“self-determination”	to	
show	how	racial	hierarchy	and	slavery	serve	as	the	foundational	structures	of	neocolonial	projects	
by	representing	Empire	as	enslavement.	These	revolutionaries	saw	colonized	groups	as	“the	key	
agents	of	global	transformation”	that	would	champion	a	view	of	an	anti-imperial	world	as	more	
than	inclusion,	but	the	development	of	an	egalitarian	world	order.125	To	combat	anti-imperial	
 
121	Ferguson,	Global	Shadows,	42-48.	
122	Getachow,	Worldmaking	after	Empire,	37-39	and	82	
123	Ibid,	58.	
124	Ibid,	10	and	Chapter	2,	“The	Counterrevolutionary	Moment:	Preserving	Racial	Hierarchy	in	the	League	of	Nations,”	37-
70.		
125	Ibid,	11	and	67.		
	
 34	
worldmaking,	imperial	figures	such	as	Roosevelt,	Churchill	and	Stalin,	began	to	develop	a	“new	
world	order”	after	World	War	II	with	the	establishment	of	the	United	Nations	(U.N.).	The	U.N.	was	
designed	to	inhibit	alternative	modes	of	rule	and	“suppress	any	imaginative	civil	exploration	of	
what	a	different	world	could	look	like.”126	While	framed	as	a	neutral	institution	of	international	
stability	and	arbitration,	the	U.N.	“renders	the	parceling	of	the	world	into	discrete	units.”127	
Additionally,	more	powerful	nations	with	legacies	of	imperial	violence,	such	as	the	U.S.,	remain	
permanent	members	of	the	Security	Council,	the	governing	body	of	the	U.N.	with	the	ultimate	
power	to	veto	resolutions.	The	U.N.	is	grounded	in	the	imperial	principle	of	differential	rule	as	the	
negotiation	and	arbitration	of	appeals	occurs	between	sovereign	nation-states.128	Imperial	agents	
designed	the	international	system,	through	the	reappropriation	of	anti-imperial	conceptualizations	
of	“independence”	and	“sovereignty,”	to	facilitate	the	unequal	integration	of	smaller,	less	powerful	
states	into	the	imperial	world	order	governed	by	differential	rule	and	continued	capitalist	
exploitation.	Hence,	the	U.N.	and	by	extension	the	imperial	world	order	represent	a	manifestation	of	
the	imperial	right	to	impose	a	new	beginning.	
The	U.S.	capitalizes	on	the	imperial	right	to	impose	a	new	beginning.	The	founding	fathers	
“imagined	the	fledgling	federation	as	an	empire”129	and	subsequent	heads	of	state	have	remained	
intimately	invested	in	“the	American	federalist	project.”	They	have	discursively	tied	the	U.S.	
imperial	character	to	both	foreign	policies	of	expansion	and	domestic	efforts	to	dominate	
indigenous	populations,	enslaved	Africans,	and	political	opponents	of	the	U.S.	state.	The	
colonization	of	Hawai’i	in	1898	and	colonial	rule	of	the	Philippines	from	1898	until	1946	are	only	
two	examples	of	the	U.S.’s	role	as	a	colonizing	force	in	the	world.130	The	U.S.	continues	to	engage	in	
empire-building	throughout	the	world	and	frequently	intervenes	in	the	affairs	of	other	states,	often	
 
126	Azoulay,	Potential	History,	464.		
127	Ibid,	463.		
128	Ibid,	415.	 
129	Getachow,	Worldmaking	after	Empire,	118.		
130	Immerwahr,	How	to	Hide	an	Empire.	For	more	information	on	Hawai’i	as	a	long-distance	U.S.	colonial	project,	see	
Trask,	From	a	Native	Daughter,	124-126. 
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through	war	and	militarism,	to	set	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	the	spread	of	modern	capitalism.	
U.S.	leaders	act	as	architects	of	the	imperial	world	order	through	supranational	institutions,	such	as	
the	U.N.,	World	Bank	and	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF),	that	aid	imperial	exploitation	and	
domination.131	The	U.S.	remains	a	particularly	influential	force	in	what	Samir	Amin	calls	the	“Middle	
East	Common	Market”	directly,	through	military	occupation,	and	indirectly,	through	their	alliances	
with	Israel	and	Saudi	Arabia.132	Hence,	the	U.S.	has	always	been	and	continues	to	be	an	imperial	and	
colonial	power.	
Despite	these	origins,	“contemporary	America	is	a	multicultural	and	multireligious	political	
community	that	has	yet	to	come	to	grips	with	its	settler	origins.”133	Governmental	officials	outright	
deny	U.S.	imperial	legacies	and	practices.	During	a	1999	presidential	campaign	speech,	then-
governor	George	W.	Bush	Jr.	framed	his	intended	foreign	policy	as	U.S.-style	internationalism,	not	
an	imperialist	agenda.	He	boldly	stated	that	“America	has	never	been	an	empire,”	but	rather	the	
“only	great	power	in	history	that	had	the	chance	and	refused	[empire]	–	preferring	greatness	to	
power	and	justice	to	glory.”134	Despite	the	presence	of	countless	voices	that	decry	ongoing	U.S.	
imperial	violence,	scholars	and	experts	continue	to	minimalize	U.S.	imperial	world	and	sense-
making.	Peter	Hugill	represents	U.S.	imperial	legacies	as	a	flirtation	with	“conventional	imperial	
expansion”	during	the	late	nineteenth	century.135	Frank	Ninkovich	refers	to	the	U.S.	imperial	legacy	
as	a	“half-hearted	involvement”	that	culminated	in	a	“relatively	modest	colonial	career.”136	Michael	
Mann	equates	U.S.	imperial	policies	to	a	sort	of	haphazard	militarism	in	which	the	U.S.	acts	as	an	
egotistical	“incoherent	empire”	that	will	eventually	lead	itself	into	ruin.137	Other	scholars	claim	that	
 
131	Magdoff,	The	Age	of	Imperialism,	40-43.	See	also	Petras,	Veltmeyer,	Vasapollo,	and	Casadio,	Empire	with	Imperialism.	
These	authors	emphasize	that	most	multi-national	corporations	are	headquartered	in	Europe,	Japan,	or	the	United	States	
and	most	CEOs	and	Presidents	of	the	IMF	and	WB	have	been	either	European	or	American	elites	(pg.	14-16).		
132	Amin,	“The	Future	of	Global	Polarization,”	83.		
133	Mamdani,	Good	Muslim,	Bad	Muslim,	244.			
134	Bush,	“A	Distinctly	American	Internationalism.”	
135	Hugill,	Transition	in	Power,	298.		
136	Quote	1:	Ninkovich,	The	United	States	and	Imperialism,	4.	Quote	2:	Ninkovich,	The	United	States	and	Imperialism,	247-
249.	
137	Mann,	Incoherent	Empire,	15-16.		
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the	U.S.	engaged	in	imperial	enterprise	by	request.	Geir	Lundestad	boldly	argues	that	the	U.S.	acts	as	
an	“empire	of	invitation”	as	European	nations	often	encouraged	the	U.S.	to	take	on	a	“more	active	
interest	in	the	outside	world”	since	U.S.	policies	“were	more	in	accordance	with	the	will	of	the	local	
populations.”138	Efforts	to	frame	U.S.	imperial	enterprise	as	historic,	inherently	unstable,	or	
consensual	reproduce	the	epistemic	violence	of	archive	of	foreign	policy	documents	that	
perpetuates	Eurocentrism	and	obscures	ongoing	U.S.	imperial	violence.	
	
	 	
“Reduce	Our	Risk,	Reduce	Our	Cost”	:	U.S.	Pointillism	and	Imperial	Balance		
	
	
	 Currently,	the	U.S.	engages	in	a	pointillist	form	of	empire-building	that	takes	the	form	of	
securitization,	control,	and	surveillance	of	strategic	territories	scattered	around	the	world.	It	
remains	both	imperial	and	territorially	colonial.139	As	resistance	to	traditional	forms	of	colonization	
grew	after	World	War	II,	the	U.S.	developed	a	pointillist	empire	that	consists	of	an	array	of	military	
bases	and	securitized	points	strategically	positioned	around	the	globe.	This	ensures	a	continued	
territorial	presence	and	influence	around	the	world.	In	Afghanistan	alone,	the	U.S.	built	military	
bases	such	as	Kandahar	Airfield,	Jalalabad	Air	Base,	Camp	Leatherneck,	Bagram	Air	Base,	and	a	
variety	of	hidden	CIA	bases.	These	bases	operate	as	launching	and	landing	points	for	surveillance	
drones	as	well	the	selection	of	targets	and	for	COIN	operations	in	the	greater	Afghanistan	region.140	
U.S.	leadership	and	policy-makers	continue	to	install	and	promote	U.S.	industrial	measurements,	
language,	and	even	mundane	disciplinary	tools	such	as	the	stop	sign	as	international	standards	and	
ideals	for	what	international	institutions	describe	as	“progress”	and	“development.”141	Since	the	
 
138	Lundestad,	“Empire	by	Invitation?,”	263.		
139	See	Immerwahr,	How	to	Hide	an	Empire.		
140	Turse,	The	Changing	Face	of	Empire,	44-45	and	what	Immerwahr	describes	as	the	U.S.’s	“war	of	points.”	(Immerwahr,	
How	to	Hide	an	Empire,	372-390).	Additionally,	while	the	current	administration	is	pulling	out	of	many	of	these	bases,	
they	have	continued	to	ignore	calls	from	local	villagers	to	collect	compensation	and	return	of	their	land,	deferring	
responsibility	for	land	disputes	to	the	Afghan	government	(See	Mashal	and	Ghazi,	“U.S.	Leaves	Behind	Afghan	Bases	–	and	
a	Legacy	of	Land	Disputes”).			
141	Immerwahr,	How	to	Hide	an	Empire.		
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development	of	synthetics	and	vaccines	transformed	the	accessibility	and	functionality	of	colonized	
space,	U.S.	leadership	adapted	strategies	of	empire-building	to	ensure	continued	U.S.	dominance	of	
international	structures	of	governance	and	surveillance	of	geopolitically	strategic	areas.	Hence,	
Afghanistan	became	a	militarized	stepping-stone	into	the	Central	Asian	region	and	part	of	a	series	
of	U.S.	wars	of	conquest	upheld	by	the	imperial	archive	of	foreign	policy	documents.		
The	documents	within	these	imperial	archives	expose	how	U.S.	officials	mask	the	
transformation	of	Afghanistan,	a	geopolitically	strategic	place,	into	a	client	state.	After	the	invasion	
in	October	2001,	U.S.	officials	worked	to	transform	Afghanistan	in	accordance	with	U.S.-style	
structures	and	institutions,	such	as	a	free-market	economy	and	capitalism	all	dictated	by	advisers	
primarily	from	the	U.S.142	Douglas	Lute,	a	retired	U.S.	Army	Lieutenant	General,	stated	that	“we	[the	
U.S.	military]	stated	that	our	goal	is	to	establish	a	‘flourishing	market	economy’	[in	Afghanistan].”143	
Many	local	interviewees	from	a	2015	United	States	Institute	for	Peace	(USIP)	report,	ranging	from	
local	traders	to	CEOs	of	Afghan	corporations,	expressed	disdain	for	what	they	saw	as	a	“cut	and	
paste”	imposition	of	a	U.S.-style,	liberal	economic	policy	and	market	economy	with	no	consideration	
for	the	Afghan	context	and	too	quickly	for	the	institutions	to	be	able	to	adjust.144	Policy-makers	
used	the	U.S.-Taliban	Agreement	to	recirculate	a	representation	of	the	relationship	between	the	U.S.	
and	Afghanistan	as	economic,	a	relationship	based	on	“economic	cooperation”	and	“stability”	
through	U.S.	efforts	to	promote	economic	growth	and	private	sector	investment.145	U.S.	military	
forces	invaded	and	constructed	the	Afghan	state	as	a	transplanted	copy	of	the	U.S.,	a	nation-state	
enclave	to	serve	U.S.	geopolitical	and	capitalist	interests.		
Upon	careful	inspection,	the	documents	in	these	archives	reveal	how	the	invasion	and	
occupation	of	Afghanistan	have	been	and	remains	tied	to	the	expansion	of	capitalism	and	control	
 
142	Whitlock,	“Built	to	Fail.”			
143	Lute,	“Lessons	Learned	Record	of	Interview,”	3.	
144	Fishstein	and	Amiryar,	“Afghan	Economic	Policy,	Institutions,	and	Society	Since	2001,”	7.	
145	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“Agreement	for	Bringing	Peace	to	Afghanistan.”	
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over	global	sources	of	energy	and	resources,	such	as	oil	and	minerals.146	U.S.	imperial	agents	
expressed	interest	in	Afghanistan’s	potential	as	a	source	of	wealth	as	early	as	the	1940s.	For	
example,	the	U.S.	initiated	the	Helmand	Valley	Project	(HVP)	in	1946,	an	effort	by	U.S.	imperial	
actors	based	on	the	Tennessee	Valley	Authority	to	“translate	Afghanistan	into	the	legible	
inventories	of	material	and	human	resources	in	the	manner	of	modern	states.”147	U.S.-based	Unocal	
Corporation	proposed	a	plan	in	the	1990s	to	construct	a	lucrative	Central	Asian	Pipeline	that	would	
transport	natural	gas	from	Turkmenistan	to	India	through	Afghanistan.	While	Unocal	eventually	
abandoned	the	project	during	the	1990s,	critics	assert	that	the	securitization	of	this	pipeline	was	
the	main	source	of	motivation	behind	the	U.S.	invasion	in	2001.148	Since	the	capture	and	
exploitation	of	extractive	industries	are	primary	tactics	of	neocolonial	domination,		U.S.	experts	
frame	Afghanistan	as	a	site	of	potential	U.S.	capital	wealth,	a	nation-state	enclave	at	the	mercy	of	the	
whims	of	U.S.	capitalism.		
These	policy-makers	and	so-called	experts	continue	to	express	interest	in	making	
Afghanistan	“lucrative”	for	U.S.	capitalists	by	tapping	into	Afghanistan’s	vast	mineral	potential.	
From	2005-2006	and	2009-2011,	The	U.S.	Geological	Survey	of	the	Department	of	the	Interior	and	
the	Task	Force	for	Business	and	Stability	Operations	(TFBSO)	ran	the	USGS	Mineral	Resource	
Project.	Geological	experts	produced	two	“fact	sheets”	in	2007	and	2011	in	which	the	experts	assess	
Afghanistan’s	mineral	resources.	In	the	2011	report,	experts	claimed	to	identify	24	prioritized	
“areas	of	interest”	(AOIs)	of	non-fuel	mineral	deposits	that	could	be	targeted	for	production	and	
development	opportunities	for	U.S.	and	international	investors.149	These	documents	indicate	an	
interest	in	the	development	of	a	“thriving	market	economy”	and	“lucrative	mineral	resources”	in	
Afghanistan.	U.S.	policy-makers	and	representatives	of	state	rely	on	the	political	devices	of	
 
146	Minh-ha,	Lovecidal,	59-61.		
147	Gregory,	The	Colonial	Present,	31.		
148	See	Rashid,	Taliban:	Islam,	Oil	and	the	New	Great	Game	in	Central	Asia.		
149	Peters,	et	al.	“Summaries	of	Important	Areas	for	Mineral	Investment	and	Production	Opportunities	of	Nonfuel	Minerals	
in	Afghanistan.”	In	these	reports,	experts	outline	the	large	valuable	natural	resources	in	Afghanistan,	such	as	deposits	of	
gold,	silver,	lithium,	platinum,	iron	ore,	zinc,	bauxite,	coal,	and	copper.	
	
 39	
“stabilization”	and	“development”	in	foreign	policy	documents	that	frame	U.S.	efforts	to	gain	access	
to	Afghanistan’s	wealth	as	an	“opening	up”	of	Afghanistan	to	private	sector	investment.	
Ambassador	Wells	stated	in	2017	that	the	U.S.	does	not	want	to	create	a	“donor	economy”	in	
Afghanistan,	but	desires	to	“develop	a	private	sector	economy”	and	focus	energy	on	tapping	into	the	
extractive	sector	“which	has	been	valued	at	a	trillion	dollars.”150	U.S.	agencies	of	“development,”	
such	as	USAID,	often	center	their	policy	language	around	the	support	of	what	they	frame	as	“export-
driven	economic	growth.”151	Through	the	development	of	a	market-based	economy,	Afghanistan	is	
simply	more	open	to	the	exploitation	of	U.S.	private	sector	capitalists.		
The	documentation	in	these	imperial	archives	reveal	how	officials	construct	Afghanistan	as	
a	nation-state	enclave	through	their	narration	of	a	different	story.	They	frame	the	relationship	
between	the	U.S.	and	Afghanistan	as	an	“enduring	partnership”	based	on	the	“stabilization”	and	
“reconstruction”	of	the	Afghan	state	and	society.	In	2005,	Bush	and	President	Karzai	released	a	joint	
declaration	in	which	they	framed	the	relationship	between	the	U.S.	and	Afghanistan	as	a	“strategic	
partnership”	based	on	“democratic	principles,	respect	for	human	rights,	and	a	market	economy.”152	
U.S.	heads	of	state	have	consistently	represented	the	relationship	between	the	two	countries	as	an	
“enduring”	and/or	“strategic	partnership.”	In	2012,	Obama	and	President	Karzai	signed	the	
“Enduring	Strategic	Partnership	Agreement.”	In	the	agreement,	Obama	and	Karzai	framed	U.S.-
Afghan	relations	as	grounded	in	cooperation	between	“two	sovereign	nations”	that	have	
“partnered”	since	2001	to	“respond	to	threats	to	international	peace	and	security”	and	“strengthen	
 
150	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“Briefing	by	Acting	Assistant	Secretary	for	South	and	Central	Asian	Affairs	and	Acting	
Special	Representative	for	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan	Alice	G.	Wells.”			
151	USAID,	“Economic	Governance	&	Private	Sector	Strengthening	(EGPSS).”	Currently,	one	of	USAID’s	major	projects	is	
the	Multi-Dimensional	Economic	Legal	Reform	Assistance	Program	(MELRA).	Under	MELRA,	U.S.	government	“experts”	
from	USGS	and	Colorado	School	of	Mines	(CSM)	to	provide	“high-level	policy	and	legal	advice”	on	areas	deemed	“essential	
for	fostering	economic	growth.”	Their	listed	“accomplishments”	include	contribution	to	mining	regulations	and	model	
drafting	that	“is	expected	to	facilitate	private	sector	investment	in	extractive	sector”	and	forward	an	Open	Access	Policy	to	
increase	private	sector	investment	in	the	Information	Communications	Technology	(ICT)	sector	(See	
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/Multi-
Dimensional_Economic_Legal_Reform_Assistance_Program_MELRA.pdf).	
152	The	White	House	of	President	George	W.	Bush	Jr.,	“Joint	Declaration	of	the	United	States-Afghanistan	Strategic	
Partnership.”			
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long-term	strategic	cooperation	in	areas	of	mutual	interest.”153	Representatives	of	state,	such	as	
Ambassador	Alice	Wells,	and	official	state	departments,	such	as	the	Bureau	of	South	and	Central	
Asian	Affairs,	used	official	documents	to	strategically	represent	the	relationship	between	the	two	
countries	as	a	“real”,	“important,”	or	“bilateral	partnership.”154	Through	representations	of	the	
relationship	between	the	U.S.	and	Afghanistan	as	a	“partnership,”	officials	reaffirm	the	construction	
of	Afghanistan	as	a	nation-state	within	the	international	world	order	and	division	of	labor	for	the	
benefit	of	U.S.	corporate	greed	and	empire-building.		
At	the	same	time,	policy-makers	draft	documents	that	vehemently	deny	the	representation	
of	the	U.S.	as	“nation-building”	in	Afghanistan.	During	his	presidential	campaign,	Bush	Jr.	asserted	
that	U.S.	troops	should	be	deployed	to	fight	and	win	wars,	and	not	be	used	for	“what’s	called	nation-
building.”	President	Obama	made	similar	claims	that	the	U.S.	would	not	become	embroiled	in	what	
he	described	as	a	lengthy	“nation-building	project.”	Trump	placed	all	the	onus	for	“nation-building”	
onto	previous	administrations	and	framed	his	administration’s	foreign	policy	as	focused	on	
national	security	and	“killing	terrorists.”155	Instead,	officials	reframe	U.S.	nation-building	techniques	
as	policies	of	“reconstruction.”	In	these	documents,	they	describe	the	Afghan	state	as	“corrupt”	
and/or	“weak”	and	in	need	of	“reconstruction”	and/or	“stabilization.”	Bush,	Obama,	and	their	
officials	frequently	frame	the	Afghan	state	as	“corrupt”	and	therefore	unable	to	protect	and	provide	
social	services	to	Afghan	civilians.156	The	Obama	administration	swiftly	reframed	U.S.	actions	in	
Afghanistan	as	centered	around	COIN	operations	to	“reconstruction”	efforts.	He	represented	U.S.	
policies	in	Afghanistan	as	U.S.-led	“reconstruction”	and	“economic	assistance”	to	“train,	equip,	and	
 
153	The	White	House	of	President	Barack	Obama,	“Enduring	Strategic	Partnership	Agreement	Between	The	United	States	
of	America	And	The	Islamic	Republic	of	Afghanistan,”	1.	In	the	document,	the	two	leaders	also	outline	what	they	describe	
as	“areas	of	key	strategic	interest”	in	accordance	with	imperial	terminology	and	(sub)discourses	described	in	Chapters	1	
and	2:	“advancing	peace,	security,	and	reconciliation;	strengthening	state	institutions;	supporting	Afghanistan’s	long-term	
economic	and	social	development;	and	encouraging	regional	cooperation.”	
154	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“Briefing	by	Acting	Assistant	Secretary	for	South	and	Central	Asian	Affairs	and	Acting	
Special	Representative	for	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan	Alice	G.	Wells”	and	The	U.S.	Bureau	of	Central	and	South	Asian	
Affairs,	“U.S.	Relations	With	Afghanistan”	(January	20,	2021).		
155	The	Trump	White	House,	“Remarks	by	President	Trump	on	the	Strategy	in	Afghanistan	and	South	Asia.”		
156	Santos	and	Teixeira,	“The	essential	role	of	democracy	in	the	Bush	Doctrine:	the	invasions	of	Iraq	and	Afghanistan.”			
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sustain”	Afghan	Security	Forces.157	Through	the	framing	of	U.S.	actions	as	not	“nation-building,”	
officials	continue	to	mask	the	U.S.’s	heavy	hand	in	constructing	the	current	Afghan	institutions	and	
military	forces	for	the	benefit	of	U.S.	imperial	enterprise.		
U.S.	officials	are	interested	in	control	over	the	direction	of	Afghan	politics	and	economics,	
but	at	minimal	cost.	The	documents	indicate	that	U.S.	officials	often	frame	Afghanistan	as	a	regional	
and	increasingly	international	site	of	concern.	In	October	of	2001,	Bush	framed	the	role	of	“tak[ing]	
over	the	so-called	nation-building”	of	Afghanistan	as	a	job	for	the	international	community,	
particularly	the	U.N.158	He	also	described	what	he	referred	to	as	“stabilization”	and	“reconstruction”	
efforts	in	Afghanistan	as	the	responsibility	of	international	“partners”	and	the	NATO	coalition.	Officials	
continue	to	perpetuate	the	idea	that	responsibility	for	what	they	represent	as	the	“Afghan	Peace	
Process”	should	be	undertaken	by	international	forces	and	organizations	such	as	the	U.N.	The	
documents	uncover	how	policy-makers	call	for	an	“expanded	role	for	the	United	Nations”	in	what	
they	refer	to	as	peace	arbitration	and	reconciliation	efforts.159	They	meet	with	heads	of	other	
nations	or	attend	U.N.	sponsored	summits	and	conferences	to	discuss	with	other	“international	
partners”	about	how	to	“build	a	more	extensive	regional	and	international	consensus	on	
Afghanistan”	and	facilitate	what	they	refer	to	in	documents	as	an	“Afghan-led,	Afghan-owned	peace	
process.”160	U.S.	and	international	leadership	frame	support	in	Afghanistan	as	reliant	on	“adherence	
to	the	principles	set	out	in	the	Afghanistan	Partnership	Framework”	drafted	at	the	2020	
Afghanistan	Conference	hosted	by	the	Afghan	government,	Finland	and	the	U.N.161	Under	the	guise	
of	international	cooperation	and	“reconstruction,”	the	documents	contain	imperial	language	and	
rhetoric.	This	indicates	that	officials	continue	to	frame	a	conditions-based	integration	of	Afghanistan	
 
157	The	White	House	of	President	Barack	Obama,	“Joint	Statement	from	the	President	and	President	Karzai	of	
Afghanistan.”			
158	Whitlock,	“Built	to	Fail.”	
159	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“U.S.-Europe	Communiquè	on	the	Afghan	Peace	Process.”		
160	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“Joint	Statement	on	Trilateral	Meeting	on	Afghan	Peace	Process.”			
161	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“U.S.-Europe	Communiquè	on	the	Afghan	Peace	Process.”		
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into	the	international	community	and	regional	political-economic	spheres	at	minimal	cost	but	
maximum	benefit	to	the	U.S.	Empire.	
The	documents	bring	to	light	how	Presidents	frame	the	expansion	of	the	potential	imperial	
reach	of	the	U.S.	Empire.	In	his	“Remarks	by	the	President	on	a	New	Strategy	for	Afghanistan	and	
Pakistan,”	Obama	reframed	U.S.	actions	in	Afghanistan	as	part	of	a	larger	“AfPak”	strategy	to	
address	what	he	called	“threats”	emerging	from	Pakistan	and	Afghanistan.162	Trump	further	
expanded	the	imperial	reach	of	the	U.S.	as	he	represented	his		U.S.	foreign	policy	in	Afghanistan	as	
part	of	his	administration’s	greater	South	Asia	and	Indo-Pacific	strategy.163	As	they	continually	
reframe	the	expansive	imperial	reach	of	the	U.S.,	Presidents	reaffirm	Afghanistan	as	an	imperial	
nation-state	enclave	that	is	perpetually	open	to	U.S.	intervention.	They	emphasize	and	document	
how	the	U.S.	will	continue	to	“monitor”	Afghanistan	and	retain	a	“sustained	counterterrorism	force”	
to	“dismantle[e]	terrorist	groups	that	seek	to	attack	the	United	States.”164	As	disagreement	around	
the	implications	of	the	U.S.-Taliban	agreement	grew,	Trump	issued	an	imperial	warning:	“we	[the	
U.S.]	can	always	go	back	if	we	have	to.	If	we	have	to	go	back,	we’ll	go	back,	and	we’ll	go	back	
raging.”165	Therefore,	the	U.S.	does	not	withdraw	from	Afghanistan,	for	Afghanistan	is	enshrined	in	
the	archive	of	foreign	policy	documents	as	a	potential	site	of	perpetual	militarized	return.		
As	Noam	Chomsky	states,	U.S.	militarism	and	interventionism	in	Afghanistan	represents	an	
example	of	U.S.	imperial	world-making	with	“tactical	adjustments	to	changing	circumstances.”166	
Since	empires	have	historically	weakened	due	to	overextension,	the	documents	in	U.S.	foreign	
policy	archives	uncover	how	U.S.	imperial	agents	frame	U.S.	interventionism	as	in	need	of	“balance.”	
 
162	The	White	House	of	President	Barack	Obama,	“Remarks	by	the	President	on	a	New	Strategy	for	Afghanistan	and	
Pakistan.”		
163	The	Trump	White	House,	“Remarks	by	President	Trump	on	the	Strategy	in	Afghanistan	and	South	Asia.”	
164	The	Trump	White	House,	“President	Donald	J.	Trump	Is	Taking	A	Historic	Step	To	Achieve	Peace	in	Afghanistan	And	
Bring	Our	Troops	Home.”		
165	Macias,	“Trump	hints	at	US	withdrawal	in	Afghanistan	as	election	looms”	(this	phrase	can	be	found	in	The	Trump	
White	House,	“Remarks	By	President	Trump	on	Protecting	Seniors	with	Diabetes”).	Secretary	Mike	Pompeo	continued	to	
represent	Afghanistan	as	a	site	of	perpetual	return,	stating	that	“we’re	[the	U.S.]	going	to	come	right	back	at	it”	if	
Afghanistan	becomes	“a	threat	to	the	United	States	of	America.”	(See	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“Secretary	Michael	R.	
Pompeo	With	Steve	Doocy,	Jedediah	Bila,	and	Pete	Hegseth	of	Fox	and	Friends”).		
166	Chomsky,	9-11,	69.		
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In	an	April	2020	interview,	Pompeo	framed	U.S.	efforts	in	Afghanistan	as	part	of	Trump’s	“America	
First”	campaign	to	bring	troops	home	and		“get	the	structure	right.”167	He	constantly	represented	
U.S.	efforts	in	Afghanistan	as	part	of	U.S.	efforts	to	“reduce	our	cost,	reduce	our	risk”	abroad	and	
ensure	national	security	“with	a	smaller	footprint,	with	a	smaller	force.”168	U.S.	officials	adapt	
foreign	policy	language	to	changing	conditions	to	perpetuate	the	idea	that	the	U.S.	can	or	should	be	
free	to	pursue	interventionism	without	penalty	and	at	minimal	economic	and	human	cost.	
Therefore,	under	U.S.	imperial	rule,	there	is	no	“common	world	to	care”	only	“enclaves	to	
protect.”169	The	documents	expose	how	representatives	of	the	U.S.	state	constantly	(re)write,	
(re)produce,	and	(re)inscribe	the	U.S.’s	role	and	positionality	within	the	international	system	on	the	
grounds	of	the	idea	of	American	Exceptionalism	through	political	devices	and	techniques	of	
differentiation	that	maintain	the	imperial	right	to	construct	nation-state	enclaves.		
	
	
“The	Renegade,	Unlawful,	So-Called	Court”	:	U.S.	Citizens	and	Impunity		
	
	
The	structure	of	the	international	world	order	includes	few	institutions	designed	to	hold	
anyone,	much	less	imperial	states,	accountable	for	war	crimes,	crimes	against	humanity,	and	aggressive	
interventionism.	One	such	institution	is	The	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC),	a	supranational	legal	
institution	created	to	hold	individuals	accountable	to	international	humanitarian	law	(IHL)	and	
international	human	rights	law	(IHRL).	According	to	Article	5	of	the	Rome	Statute,	the	ICC	
maintains	jurisdiction	over	persons	for	“the	most	serious	crimes	of	concern	for	the	international	
community	as	a	whole,”	including	genocide,	crimes	against	humanity,	war	crimes,	and	the	crimes	of	
 
167	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“Secretary	Michael	R.	Pompeo	With	Pete	Mundo	of	KCMO.”	Pompeo	claims	that	achieving	
this	“balance”	entails	building	up	Afghan	forces	and	running	independent	COIN	operations.	
168	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“Secretary	Michael	R.	Pompeo	With	Pete	Mundo	of	KCMO”	and	The	U.S.	Department	of	
State,	“Secretary	Michael	R.	Pompeo	With	Steve	Doocy,	Jedediah	Bila,	and	Pete	Hegseth	of	Fox	and	Friends.”		
169	Azoulay,	Potential	History,	8.		
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aggression.170	However,	the	ICC	is	founded	on	the	protection	of	IHL	and	IHRL,	two	doctrines	that	
are	full	of	political	devices	to	reaffirm	continued	imperial	violence	of	displacement,	looting,	and	
enslavement	at	an	international	level.	Additionally,	the	ICC	and	many	other	international	
monitoring	bodies	resort	to	recommendations	or	constructive	dialogue	rather	than	definitive	
accountability	for	violations	of	human	rights.	Critics	of	the	international	structure	argue	that	the	
international	accountability	system	is	“toothless”	and	fails	to	adequately	protect	marginalized	
peoples	from	state	and	imperial	violence.171	The	ICC	and	other	international	institutions	showcase	
how	the	proliferation	of	nation-states	reaffirms	a	new	and	differential	form	of	sovereignty	
“mediated	through	imperial	political	literacy,”	or	how	well	new	states	were	able	to	conform	and	
comply	with	international	standards	of	governance	and	doctrines	based	on	liberal	values	such	as	
“human	rights.”172	
U.S.	officials	rely	on	the	vague	language	and	lack	of	enforceability	of	international	
accountability	mechanisms	to	situate	the	U.S.	as	above	and	outside	of	international	structures.	Since	
drones	target	individuals	rather	than	soldiers,	U.S.	officials	use	stigmatized	labels,	such	as	“unlawful	
combatant,”	insurgents”,	“jihadists,”	and	“suspected	terrorists,”	to	represent	Afghans	as	outside	of	
international	rights	and	protections.173	In	fact,	under	U.S.	national	law,	the	President	holds	
executive	powers	to	use	“all	necessary	and	appropriate	force”	against	nations,	organizations,	and	
individuals	who	either	perpetrated	the	terrorist	attack	on	September	11th,	2001	or	“in	order	to	
prevent	any	future	attacks	of	international	terrorism	against	the	United	States.”174	And,	U.S.	citizens	
are	rarely	held	accountable	through	national	legal	circuits.	Trump	personally	issued	war	pardons	
on	two	separate	occasions	for	military	figures	scheduled	to	face	trial	in	the	U.S.	court	system	for	
 
170	ICC,	“Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court,”	3.	The	UN	General	Assembly	adopted	the	Rome	Statute	in	1998	
which	entered	into	force	in	2002.		
171	Smith,	“Human	Rights	in	International	Law,”	66	&	70-72.		
172	Azoulay,	Potential	History,	436.		
173	Sterio,	“The	United	States’	Use	of	Drones	in	the	War	on	Terror:	The	(Il)Legality	of	Targeted	Killings	Under	
International	Law,”	207-208.		
174	107th	Congress,	“Joint	Resolution.”		
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war	crimes	in	Afghanistan.175		Since	international	institutions	rely	on	the	general	nation-state	legal	
structures	to	pursue	legal	action	against	human	rights	violations,	U.S.	leadership	can	avoid	and/or	
resist	anything	framed	as	an	effort	to	hold	the	U.S.	accountable	for	imperial	crimes	in	Afghanistan.		
The	construction	of	U.S.	exterritoriality	to	international	accountability	is	tied	to	the	
construction	of	the	“U.S.	citizen”	as	insulated	from	international	laws	and	jurisdictions.	Despite	its	
role	in	the	negotiation	of	the	Rome	Statute,	the	U.S.	negotiation	team	rejected	becoming	a	signatory	
party	to	the	ICC	to	limit	the	court’s	jurisdiction	over	U.S.	nationals.176	The	team	ultimately	rejected	
the	vague	definition	of	“crimes	of	aggression”	because	it	could	be	applied	to	U.S.	military	personnel	
in	active	combat	zones	and	objected	to	the	inability	of	U.S.	officials	to	negotiate	for	“special	
accommodation	for	anti-terrorism	conventions.”177	Michael	Ignatieff	refers	to	efforts	by	U.S.	policy-
makers	to	portray	and	construct	the	U.S.	and	U.S.	citizens	as	"leaders”	and	“outliers”	in	international	
politics	as	an	embodiment	of	“American	Exceptionalism.”	These	documents	unveil	how	U.S.	officials	
represent	Afghanistan	as	a	space	of	exception	for	U.S.	imperial	violence	and	frame	U.S.	inclusion	in	
and	adherence	to	international	structures	“on	its	own	terms.”178		
Given	the	sheer	violence	and	destruction	of	U.S.	militarism,	international	institutions	could	
pursue	legal	action	against	U.S.	nationals	for	war	crimes	and/or	crimes	of	aggression	in	
Afghanistan.	According	to	the	Rome	Statute,	a	war	crime	constitutes	the	“incidental	loss	of	life	or	
injury	to	civilians”	and	crimes	of	aggression	the	“bombardment	by	the	armed	forces	of	a	State	
against	the	territory	of	another	State	or	the	use	of	any	weapons	by	a	State	against	the	territory	of	
 
175	Superville,	“Trump	intervenes	in	military	justice	cases,	grants	pardons.”	In	November	of	2019,	President	Trump	signed	
a	Full	Pardon,	an	Executive	Grant	of	Clemency,	for	Army	First	Lieutenant	Clint	Lorance	and	Army	Major	Mathew	Golsteyn.	
Lorance	was	convicted	in	2013	of	second-degree	murder	and	obstruction	of	justice	by	a	military	jury	after	ordering	his	
regiment	to	fire	on	unarmed	Afghan	civilians	and	Golsteyn	was	awaiting	trial	for	murder.		
176	Scheffer,	“Staying	the	Course	with	the	International	Criminal	Court.”	
177	Ibid,	84.	U.S.	leadership	has	refused	to	ratify	countless	international	doctrines	on	the	protection	marginalized	
communities	and	the	promotion	of	peace.	This	includes	(but	is	not	limited	to):	The	International	Covenant	on	Economic,	
Social,	and	Cultural	Rights	(ICESCR),	the	two	1977	Protocols	to	the	Geneva	Conventions,	the	Convention	on	the	
Elimination	on	All	Forms	of	Discrimination	Against	Women	(CEDAW),	the	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	(UNCRC)	
in	addition	to	the	ICC.	The	U.S.	ratified	all	four	Geneva	Conventions	and	the	third	additional	Protocol	of	2005	but	failed	to	
ratify	the	two	Geneva	Protocols	of	1977	primarily	centered	on	addressing	protection	of	individuals	in	active	hostilities.	
178	Ignatieff,	“Introduction:	American	Exceptionalism	and	Human	Rights,”	23.		
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another	State.”179	The	increased	use	of	unmanned	drones	has	transformed	all	places	into	potential	
battlefields	susceptible	to	surveillance	and	a	“risk-free	ethics	of	killing.”180	This	is	especially	the	
case	in	Afghanistan	since	2011,	as	drone	warfare	tactics	has	and	continues	to	produce	severe	
civilian	casualties	and	displacement.	In	2019,	the	U.S.	conducted	a	drone	strike	which	Colonel	
Sonny	Leggert,	spokesperson	for	U.S.	forces	in	Afghanistan,	described	as	a	“drone	strike	against	
Da’esh	(IS)	terrorists	in	Nangarhar.”	But,	the	drone	strike	killed	at	least	30	civilians	resting	after	a	
day	of	work	on	a	local	pine	nut	farm.181	In	a	2019	United	Nations	Assistance	Mission	in	Afghanistan	
(UNAMA)	report,	UNAMA	agents	exposed	how	U.S.	and	U.S.-trained	Afghan	forces	contributed	to	
more	civilian	deaths	than	what	they	referred	to	as	“Anti-Government	Forces”	as	83%	of	the	
casualties	stemmed	from	International	Military	Forces	“amidst	reports	of	increasing	airstrikes	as	
part	of	the	United	States’	strategy	to	target	the	Taliban	and	“set	the	conditions	for	a	political	
settlement”	in	the	first	six	months	of	2019.182	Yet,	these	facts	are	expunged	from	official	archives	of	
foreign	policy.	In	the	name	of	“national	security”	and	the	protection	of	“U.S.	citizen,”	Afghanistan	is	
constructed	as	a	space	of	exception	where	all	respect	for	the	life	and	well-being	of	the	Afghan	
people	is	destroyed.		
Members	of	the	U.S.	government	actively	defers	responsibility	for	war	crimes	and	crimes	
against	humanity	by	not	only	avoiding	mechanisms	of	accountability	but	rejecting	calls	for	
accountability.	In	early	2019,	NPR	reported	that	the	ICC	refused	a	probe	into	U.S	and	Afghan	Forces’	
war	crimes	in	Afghanistan	due	to	concerns	over	U.S.	compliance	to	court	procedures	that	would	
“make	the	prospects	for	a	successful	investigation	and	prosecution	extremely	limited.”183	This	
comes	after	U.S.	officials	vehemently	threatened	punitive	action	against	ICC	officials	if	they	pursued	
investigative	proceedings.	John	Bolton	proclaimed	that	the	Trump	administration	would	“use	any	
 
179	Definition	1:	ICC,	“Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court,”	5-6.	Definition	ICC,	“Rome	Statute	of	the	
International	Criminal	Court,”	4-8.		
180	Minh-ha,	Lovecidal,	32.		
181	Sultan	and	Sediqi,	“U.S.	drone	strike	kills	30	pine	nut	farm	workers	in	Afghanistan.”		
182	UNAMA,	“Midyear	Update	On	The	Protection	Of	Civilian	In	Armed	Conflict	1	January	To	30	June		2019,”	1	and	8.		
183	Kennedy,	“World	Criminal	Court	Rejects	Probe	Into	U.S.	Actions	in	Afghanistan.”	
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and	all	means	necessary	to	protect	our	citizens	and	those	of	our	allies	from	unjust	prosecution	from	
an	illegitimate	court.”184	After	the	ICC	rejected	the	initial	probe,	Trump	framed	the	ICC’s	decision	as	
a	“major	international	victory,	not	only	for	these	patriots,	but	for	the	rule	of	law.”185	U.S.	officials	
reiterated	their	disdain	when	the	ICC	authorized	an	investigation	into	war	crimes	against	Taliban,	
Afghan,	and	U.S.	forces	in	March	of	2020.186	Pompeo	boldly	called	the	ICC	a	“renegade	court”	
designed	to	prosecute	“rogue	regimes,	dictators,	others	massacring	people”	rather	than	“American	
soldiers.”187	The	documents	showcase	how	officials	articulate	a	form	of	differential	rule	within	the	
international	system	that	represents	the	U.S.	as	a	force	with	the	imperial	right	to	act	with	relative	
impunity	in	secured	enclaves	throughout	the	globe,	the	right	to	predation	and	the	“subjugation	of	
life	to	the	power	of	death.”188	
The	imperial	right	to	act	with	impunity	rests	on	the	concept	of	responsibility	for	governance.	
U.S.	officials	consistently	represent	U.S.	actions	in	Afghanistan	as	support	for	the		“training,	
organizing,	equipping,	and	sustaining”	local	Afghan	security	and	military	forces	until	the	“transfer	
of	responsibility	for	governance	over	to	the	Afghan	government.”189	U.S.	officials	often	employ	this	
language	in	conjunction	with	representations	of	the	Afghan	government	as	“failed”	or	“corrupt”	or	
“incapable”	of	reinforcing	the	idea	that	the	U.S.	acts	as	an	“advisor”	and	“facilitator”	in	an	“Afghan-
led	Afghan	owned”	process.	Whether	it	be	USAID’s	webpage	titled	“Journey	to	Self-Reliance”	to	
“[help]	countries	solve	their	own	development	challenges”	or	state	officials	that	describe	security	in	
Afghanistan	is	“an	Afghan	issue,”190		policy-makers	represent	U.S.	actions	as	necessary	to	make	
 
184	Morello,	“Trump	administration	applauds	international	court’s	decision.”		
185	Ibid.	See	also	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“Unanimous	Rejection	of	International	Criminal	Court	Investigation.”			
186	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“ICC	Decision	on	Afghanistan.”	
187	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“Secretary	Michael	R.	Pompeo	With	Steve	Doocy,	Jedediah	Bila,	and	Pete	Hegseth	of	Fox	
and	Friends.”	Pompeo	has	also	framed	ICC	probes	as	“a	threat”	from	“rogue	courts”	which	the	Trump	administration	
“moved	heaven	and	earth	to	prevent	from	wrongfully	prosecuting	[U.S.	army	personnel].”	(see	The	U.S.	Department	of	
State,	“A	Foreign	Policy	In	Service	to	Our	Veterans”).	See	also	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“ICC	Decision	on	Afghanistan.”		
188	Mbembe,	Necropolitics,	92.	See	also	page	104	where	Mbembe	describes	“a	universal	right	of	predation.”			
189	The	White	House	of	President	Barack	Obama,	“Remarks	by	the	President	in	Address	To	the	Nation	on	the	Way	
Forward	in	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan.”			
190	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“Secretary	Michael	R.	Pompeo	With	Steve	Doocy,	Jedediah	Bila,	and	Pete	Hegseth	of	Fox	
and	Friends,”	and	USAID,	“The	Journey	to	Self-Reliance.”		
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Afghan	leaders	and	institutions	“capable”	of	assuming	responsibility	for	governance.	They	mask	the	
production	of	these	local	politicians	into	compliant	imperial	figureheads,	“endowed	with	imperial	
power	and	knowledge	of	‘modernization.’”191	In	the	archive,	we	can	see	how	U.S.	leadership	frame	
“responsibility”	of	local	Afghan	actors	to	govern	and	U.S.	actors	to	oversee	Afghanistan	as	an	
omnipotent	yet	invisible	force	with	the	power	to	act	free	from	the	constraints	of	international	
accountability	and	scrutiny.		
The	documents	expose	how	leading	officials	and	spokespeople,	particularly	under	Trump,	
masked	and	deferred	imperial	responsibility	in	Afghanistan	away	from	the	U.S.	They	represented	
the	relationship	between	Afghanistan	and	the	U.S.	as	a	“partnership”	between	two	sovereign	
nations	with	the	purpose	of	“reconstruction”	and	integration	into	global	institutions	and	markets.	
Yet	U.S.	officials	held	negotiations	and	made	political	promises	of	the	Afghan	government	without	
their	presence	in	the	2020	U.S.-Taliban	Agreement,	such	as	the	release	of	5,000	political	
prisoners.192	They	framed	the	Afghan	government	and	security	forces	as	responsible	for	an	
“Afghan-led,	Afghan-owned”	peace	and	represented	violence	in	Afghanistan	as	a	localized	“conflict”	
or	“civil	war”	that	belonged	to	the	Afghan	people.	Through	these	documents,	policy-makers	
discursively	transformed	Afghanistan	into	a	site	of	U.S.	imperial	sovereignty,	a	bounded	space	
where	the	U.S.	can	act	without	fear	of	retribution	or	scrutiny,	and	the	U.S.	state	and	its	citizens	as	
immune	from	imperial	accountability.193	In	order	to	maintain	the	balance	of	this	pointillist	empire,	
the	U.S.	imperial	state	depends	on	the	socialized	complicity	of	the	U.S.	citizen,	or	the	citizen-
perpetrator.		
	 	
 
191	Azoulay,	Potential	History,	182-183.		
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CHAPTER	III:	Citizen-Perpetrators	and	the	Reproduction	of	the	
Imperial	Condition	
	
	
	
This	chapter	illustrates	how	U.S.	imperial	actors	socialize	U.S.	citizens	into	the	situated	role	
of	citizen-perpetrator.	The	maintenance	of	the	imperial	condition	relies	on	the	distribution	and	
weaponization	of	differentiated	subject	positions	and	the	socialization	of	people	to	assume	their	
prescribed	roles	within	the	imperial	world	order.194	The	documents	within	these	archives	indicate	
that	U.S.	imperial	actors	frame	the	relationship	between	the	U.S.	and	Afghanistan	in	constant	
reference	to	events	represented	as	sacralized	moments	of	national	trauma.	Hence,	through	the	use	
of	political	devices	in	and	archival	procedures	of	these	documents,	policy-makers	train	U.S.	citizens	
to	accept	the	legitimacy	of	the	archive	and	construct	Afghanistan	as	a	site	of	U.S.	wounded	identity	
grounded	in	the	idea	of	“American	sacrifice”	and	“victimhood.”	Once	socialized	to	hold	no	empathy	
for	those	who	are	impacted	by	U.S.	empire-building,	U.S.	citizens	assume	the	role	of	citizen-
perpetrators	and	function	as	a	foundational	figure	in	the	reproduction	and	normalization	of	U.S.	
imperial	enterprise.		
	
	
Citizen-Perpetrators	and	Socialized	Complicity		
	
	
	 An	imperial	condition	is	often	grounded	in	the	“expansion	of	the	principle	of	movement”	
that	“renders	violence	socially	acceptable.”195	The	coordinated	movement	of	archival	shutters	
produces	representation	that	functions	as	the	underpinning	of	the	imperial	production	of	
knowledge.	Imperial	actors	emerge	from	vast	imperial	epistemologies	designed	to	protect	imperial	
ambition	and	its	political	manifestations.	As	a	result,	they	engage	in	epistemic	violence	as	they	
 
194	Azoulay,	Potential	History,	33	and	433.		
195	Ibid,	45.  
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ground	imperial	epistemologies	in	racialized	hierarchies	of	differentiation	and	the	production	of	
subject-object,	Self-Other	relations	through	discourses	of	power,	such	as	European	Universalism,	
Orientalism,	Western	Society,	and	Africa.196	Since	archival	regimes	construct	and	maintain	the	
imperial	condition,	the	process	of	unlearning	and	interrupting	the	reproduction	of	the	imperial	
condition	involves	the	rejection	of	“the	story	the	shutter	tells”	in	a	way	where	“neutrality	is	
acknowledged	as	an	exercise	of	violence.”197	
	 The	imperial	condition	manifests	as	the	indoctrination	of	people	into	situated	imperial	
subjectivities	that	frame	who	can	be	considered	as	fully	human	and	who	cannot,	or	the	“distribution	
of	subject	positions.”198	Everyone	within	the	colonial-imperial	system	is	socialized	to	internalize	
these	historically	produced	subjectivities	and	epistemological	frames	to	disavow	imperial	violence	
and	colonial	enterprise.199	This	includes	politicians,	scholars,	photographers,	historians,	and	social	
scientists	all	of	whom	work	together	to	construct	and	uphold	the	neutrality	of	archives	and	the	
systems	of	classification	and	differentiation	that	provide	momentum	for	the	movement	of	imperial	
shutters.	For	example,	scholars	have	the	potential	to	engage	in	critical	scholarship,	speak	up	about	
injustice,	“widen	the	field	of	discussion,”	and	connect	various	anti-imperial	movements	across	time	
and	space.200	Yet,	many	European	and	American	scholars	engage	in	epistemic	violence	against	
subaltern	groups,	particularly	women,	as	they	attempt	to	define	“the	colonized”	as	an	object	of	
study	from	whom	they	can	“save”	and	extract	“data”	from	for	personal	gain.201	Authors	often	dis-
embed	and	de-politicize	revolutionary	thinkers,	such	as	Frantz	Fanon,	from	their	respective	
contexts	in	favor	of	institutionalized	social	science	disciplines.202	Historians	often	construct	and	
 
196	See	Said,	Orientalism	;	Wallerstein,	European	Universalism	;	Mudimbe,	The	Invention	of	Africa.		
197	Azoulay,	Potential	History,	7.		
198	Ibid,	32.		
199	Mudimbe,	The	Invention	of	Africa	;	Mitchell	Colonizing	Egypt	;	and	Spivak,	“Can	the	Subaltern	Speak?”,	271-313.	
200	Said,	Orientalism	xxxiii	(quote)	and	331.		
201	Spivak,	“Can	the	Subaltern	Speak?”,	271-313	;	Mohanty,	“Under	Western	Eyes:	Feminist	Scholarship	and	Colonial	
Discourse”	;	Smith,	Decolonizing	Methodologies.		
202	Alessandrini,	Frantz	Fanon	and	the	Future	of	Cultural	Politics,	30	For	example,	scholars	miss	the	shared	effort	to	
construct	an	“ethics	without	subjects”	or	“humanism	effect”	between	Fanon	and	Foucault	by	fixing	them	on	opposing	ends	
of	the	“humanist”	spectrum	(76-77).		
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reinforce	conventional	narratives	of	national	“History”	through	the	exclusion	of	the	experiences	of	
marginalized	groups.203	These	“experts”	and	social	scientists	illuminate	the	importance	of	
complicity	to	the	reproduction	of	the	imperial	condition	due	to	the	ability	of	complicit	parties	to	
mask	imperial	violence	and	inhibit	the	development	of	solidarity	for	the	recovery	of	the	human	
condition.		
	 Just	as	imperial	points	and	nation-state	enclaves	are	regime-made,	so	are	the	citizens	that	
uphold	the	imperial	state.204	States	and	citizenship	are	constructed	and	determined	through	the	
production	and	maintenance	of	boundaries	based	on	borders	and	hierarchies	of	truth	that	
demarcate	a	separation	between	an	inside	and	an	outside.	Through	political	devices	and	archival	
procedures,	imperial	actors	produce	physical	and	emotional	distance	and	space	between	
perpetrators	and	victims	of	imperial	violence	and	socialize	citizens	into	a	constant	state	of	
emergency.205	As	a	result,	U.S.	citizens	internalize	and	normalize	constructed	“geographies	of	evil”	
and	U.S.	violence	and	aggressive	militarism	as	an	“appropriate”	response	that	“absolve[s]	the	U.S.	of	
responsibility.”206	Therefore,	U.S.	citizen-perpetrators	do	not	see	or	experience	themselves	as	
complicit	perpetrators	to	U.S.	militarism.	Citizens,	who	acknowledge	an	authority,	legitimacy,	and	
neutrality	of	archives	and	differential	rule,	separate	themselves	from	the	abstracted	imperial	
crimes	tucked	away	in	the	archive.	The	reproduction	of	the	imperial	condition	involves	a	series	of	
coordinated	thresholds:	the	construction	and	balance	of	nation-state	enclaves	as	well	as	the	
production	of	citizen-perpetrators	to	uphold	the	imperial	state.	
	 The	imperial	condition	is	founded	on	the	principle	of	differential	rule	and	mass	
displacement	on	domestic	and	international	levels.207	U.S.	actions	in	Afghanistan	have	caused	
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significant	displacement,	casualties,	and	death.	U.S.	operations	have	caused	the	deaths	of	over	1.5	
million	Afghans	in	comparison	to	thousands	of	U.S.	soldiers.	Since	the	U.S.	invasion	in	2001,	the	U.S.	
has	displaced	over	5.3	million	Afghans	as	they	are	forced	to	leave	their	homes	to	escape	forced	
evictions,	death	threats,	drone	strikes,	and	“large-scale	ethnic	cleansing.”208	Those	framed	as	
outside	of	the	U.S.	imperial	state	are	labeled	as	non-citizens,	“refugees,”	and	“displaced.”	Many	of	
these	refugees	and	displaced	persons	remain	in	a	perpetual	state	of	“being-in-expulsion,”	acting	as	a	
constant	challenge	to	the	modern	nation-state	system.209	Within	these	documents,	these	crimes	are	
framed	as	a	result	of	a	“humanitarian	crisis”	or	“civil	war”	in	Afghanistan.	Through	the	documents	
in	these	archives,	representatives	and	spokespeople	for	presidential	administrations	socialize	and	
train	U.S.	citizens	to	support	or	ignore	grotesque	state	violence	and	accept	the	legitimacy	of	the	U.S.	
archives	and	differential	body	politics	that	protect	them	from	state	violence.210	Citizens	then	
assume	their	prescribed	role	as	citizen-perpetrators.		
	 Citizen-perpetrators	function	as	the	backbone	of	the	imperial	state	through	their	complicity	
and	acceptance	of	imperial	rights,	such	as	the	right	to	destroy	worlds	and	rule.211	In	the	U.S.,	the	
role	of	citizen-perpetrator	is	grounded	in	a	weaponized	form	of	national	identification	that	
facilitates	pointillistic	empire-building.	Since	national	leaders	are	constantly	involved	in	negotiating	
the	ideal	“national	identity”	and	policies	that	constitute	it,	states	are	always	in	the	process	of	
“becoming.”212	Officials	put	a	considerable	amount	of	time	and	resources	into	the	weaponization	of	
emotions	such	as	fear,	nostalgia,	and	paranoia	in	service	of	the	development	of	a	masculinist	
ethnonationalism	in	the	U.S.213	Those	who	construct	and	frame	conceptualizations	of	“National	
 
208	Vine	et.	al,	“Creating	Refugees:	Displacement	Caused	by	the	United	States’	Post-9/11	Wars,”	3.	Since	2001,	U.S.	
militarism	and	war	has	produced	2,083,126	Afghan	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	and	3,218,827	internally	displaced	
persons	(IDPs)	(18).		
209	Minh-ha,	Lovecidal,		2.	
210	Azoulay,	Potential	History,	126	and	203.	
211	Ibid,	522.  
212	Campbell,	Writing	Security,	11.	
213	Stanley,	How	Fascism	Works:	The	Politics	of	Us	and	Them,	19.	See	also	Wendy	Brown’s	article	on	“Wounded	
Attachments”	and	Jacqueline	Rose’s	article	on	how	moments	of	national	trauma	can	serve	efforts	to	militarize	national	
identification.		
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Identity”	rely	on	the	performativity	of	nationalist	representations.214		In	his	influential	essay,	
“DissemiNation:	Time,	Narrative,	and	the	Margins	of	the	Modern	Nation,”	Homi	Bhabha	
conceptualizes	the	“Nation”	as	“a	narrative	strategy	–	and	an	apparatus	of	power	–	that	produces	a	
continual	slippage	into	analogous,	even	metonymic,	categories,	like	the	people,	minorities,	or	
‘cultural	difference’	that	continually	overlap	in	the	act	of	writing	the	nation.”215	Foreign	policy-
makers	strive	to	produce	a	unified,	idealized	national	sense	of	identification	that	is	exclusionary	of	
even	U.S.	citizens	framed	as	outside	and/or	against	the	representation	of	the	good	“American	
citizen,”	such	as	the	black	community,	the	queer	and	trans	community,	the	disabled,	the	
undocumented,	and	women.	These	marginalized	communities	within	the	U.S.	experience	the	
devastating	effects	of	differential	rule	such	as	differential	treatment,	increased	levels	of	
surveillance,	and	consistent	violence	from	the	U.S.	state.	The	archival	regime	extends	this	
differential	treatment	internationally,	as	“the	way	America	treats	its	marginalized	citizens	at	home	
is	mirrored	in	the	way	it	treats	both	its	foreigners	of	color	within	and	its	others	abroad.”216	Through	
systems	of	differentiation	and	the	production	of	citizenship,	U.S.	officials	construct	a	sense	of	
national	identification	rooted	in	white	supremacy	and	hyper-militarized	ethnonationalism	and	
“gained	through	the	exclusion	and	denigration	of	others.”217		
	 Citizen-perpetrators	become	grounded	in	the	performance	of	a	wounded	national	identity.	
The	documents	uncover	how	officials	construct	a	wounded	and	militarized	national	identification	
that	functions	as	the	foundation	for	the	imperial	subject,	the	citizen-perpetrator.218	As	
governmental	personnel	frame	the	country	and	its	citizens	as	outside	and	above	international	
accountability,	U.S.	citizens	come	to	see	themselves	as	exceptional,	excluded	from	the	violent	world	
 
214	McLeod,	Beginning	Postcolonialism,	117-120	and	Bhabha,	“DissemiNation:	time,	narrative,	and	the	margins	of	the	
modern	nation,”	299.		
215	Bhabha,	“DissemiNation,”	293.		
216	Minh-ha,	Lovecidal,	22-23	(quote	on	23).	
217	McLeod,	Beginning	Postcolonialism,	112.		
218	Rose,	The	Question	of	Zion,	Chapter	3	“Break	their	bones”:	Zionism	as	Politics	(Violence),	108-155	and	Brown,	
“Wounded	Attachments:	Late	Modern	Oppositional	Political	Foundations.”		
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of	colonialism	and	capitalist	exploitation.219		To	reinforce	the	construction	of	nation-state	enclaves	
of	the	U.S.	pointillist	empire,	U.S.	leadership	map	threats	of	War	and	Terrorism	onto	imperial	
points,	like	Afghanistan.	Presidents	and	those	who	claim	to	speak	on	behalf	of	the	state	then	frame	
strategic	moments	in	U.S.	history	as	moments	of	extreme	injury	and	exceptional	national	trauma	for	
citizens	of	what	is	represented	as	the	“American	nation.”	220	This	allows	officials	the	opportunity	to	
frame	the	relationship	between	Afghanistan	and	the	U.S.	as	one	based	around	the	idea	of	U.S.	
suffering	and	sacrifice.	Therefore,	Afghanistan	becomes	a	site	of	U.S.	wounded	identity	and	
exceptional	“American	victimhood”	as	the	U.S	is	represented	as	a	benevolent	victim,	a	force	of	good	
that	continues	to	suffer	from	the	aggression	from	those	labeled	as	“Other.”	
	
 
“American	Blood	and	Treasure”	:	U.S.	Wounded	Victimhood		
	 	
	
	 From	these	foreign	policy	documents,	we	can	see	that	U.S.	officials	represent	the	
relationship	between	Afghanistan	and	the	U.S.	as	rooted	in	what	is	framed	as	exceptional	U.S.	
victimhood.	Through	the	weaponization	of	fear,	memorialization	of	9/11,	and	glorification	of	
“American	victory”	and	“sacrifice,”	officials	disseminate	discourses	of	danger	that	facilitate	a	state	
of	paranoia	of	potential	danger.	This	permanent	state	of	insecurity	provides	policy-makers	with	an	
opportunity	to	manufacture	“bogeymen”	and	frame	nation-state	enclaves	as	sites	of	threats	to	be	
controlled,	surveilled,	or	even	eradicated.221	The	weaponization	of	the	affect	of	fear	becomes	
intimately	tied	to	the	production	of	geographies	of	evil	and	systems	of	differentiation	that	reaffirm	
the	imperial	state.	U.S.	citizen-perpetrators	become	immersed	in	what	Achille	Mbembe	calls	a	
“society	of	enmity,”	a	perpetual	state	of	being	driven	by	a	desire	for	an	enemy,	a	fantasy	of	
 
219	Azoulay,	Potential	History,	50-53,	203	and	501-502.		
220	From	the	Vietnam	War	to	the	Cold	War,	U.S.	officials	often	weaponize	collective	memorialization	to	legitimate	U.S.	
intervention	and	normalize	direct	intervention	and	“low-intensity	conflict.”	See	Nguyen,	Nothing	Ever	Dies,	7.		
221	Mbembe,	Necropolitics,	44-54.	
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extermination,	and	the	anxiety	of	annihilation	that	drives	U.S.	imperial	world-making.222	As	U.S.	
citizens	gradually	internalize	geographies	of	evil	and	subsequent	affect	of	fear,	they	come	to	accept	
the	principle	of	differential	rule	that	protects	and	insulates	U.S.	citizens	from	experiencing	
themselves	as	perpetrators	to	imperial	violence.		
	 U.S.	foreign	policy	members	can	look	into	the	archive	and	strategically	select	events	that	can	
be	reframed	and	transformed	into	sacralized	moments	of	exceptional	U.S.	suffering	and	
victimization.	Many	legitimizing	rationales	of	the	imperial	condition,	such	as	the	War	on	Terror,	
pivot	around	one	particular	moment	from	U.S.	history:	September	11th,	2001	(9/11).	223	U.S.	foreign	
policy-makers	framed	9/11	as	an	essential,	defining	moment	in	the	relationship	between	the	U.S.	
and	Afghanistan.224	While	9/11	had	the	potential	to	build	global	solidarity,	U.S.	officials	represented	
9/11	as	an	“act	of	war”	from	a	growing	threat	of	anti-American	“terrorism.”	From	the	constant	
replay	of	news	footage	and	images	to	annual	memorial	gatherings	with	ceremonies	and	speeches	to	
the	2010	Park51	“Ground	Zero	Mosque	controversy,”225	U.S.	officials,	experts	and	media	outlets	
construct	their	representations	of	9/11	around	Islamophobic	rhetoric	that	reinforce	what	Nazia	
Kazi	describes	as	Orientalist	myths	that	reaffirm	empire,	such	the	myth	that	Islam	is	inherently	
violent	and	the	myth	that	Muslims	are	incapable	of	democratic	self-rule.226	These	representations	
serve	the	logic	of	capitalism,	as	a	vast	network	of		Christian	Zionists,	misinformation	experts,	and	
radical	neoconservatives	that	Nathan	Lean	dubs	the	Islamophobia	Network,	profit	from	this	
 
222	Mbembe,	Necropolitics,	43.	See	also	Minha-ha,	Lovecidal	and	the	development	of	a	Mindset	of	militarism	facilitates	
perpetual	war	(47).		
223	Gregory,	The	Colonial	Present,	13	
224	Ibid,	25.	See	also	sources	on	Islamophobia:	Feffer,	Crusade	2.0	;	Kazi,	Islamophobia,	Race,	and	Global	Politics	;	Lean,	The	
Islamophobia	Industry	;	Kumar,	Islamophobia.	
225	The	“Ground	Zero	Mosque”	controversy	of	2010	centers	around	protests	of	right-wing,	anti-Muslim	individuals,	such	
as	Pamela	Gellar	and	Robert	Spencer,	and	groups,	such	as	the	Stop	Islamization	of	America	(SIOA),	against	the	
construction	of	Park51,	an	Islamic	community	center	in	Lower	Manhattan.	Their	arguments	against	the	construction	of	
the	center	pivoted	around	Islamophobic	rhetoric,	such	as	the	center’s	proximity	to	Ground	Zero,	and	was	part	of	a	rise	in	
anti-Muslim	violence	in	the	summer	of	2010.	For	more	information	see	Kazi,	Islamophobia,	Race,	and	Global	Politics,	23-24	
;	Kumar,	165-169	;	Lean,	The	Islamophobia	Industry,	40-41	;	Feffer,	Crusade	2.0,	7-9.		
226	Kazi,	Islamophobia,	Race,	and	Global	Politics,	“The	Persistence	of	Orientalist	Myths,”	41-62.		
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manufactured	“Green	Scare”	and	militarized	national	identification	in	service	of	U.S.	empire-
building.227		
	 The	documents	in	foreign	policy	archives	reveal	how	policy-makers	transformed	9/11	into	
an	exceptional	tragedy	that	fit	comfortably	into	other	anchor	points	of	“American	victimhood,”	such	
as	the	Cold	War	and	Pearl	Harbor.228	U.S.	officials	continually	reproduces	“small	traumas”	through	
the	constant	reminder	of	“the	tragedy”	and	the	“horrors”	of	9/11.	The	Bush	Jr.	Administration	
consistently	pivoted	their	representations	of	U.S.	actions	in	Afghanistan	around	the	memory	of	
9/11	as	an	exceptional	tragedy.229	9/11	has	even	been	memorialized	through	the	construction	of	an	
official	“9/11	Memorial	Museum”	on	the	exact	site	where	the	Twin	Towers	stood	in	New	York.230	
Many	officials	reference	9/11	as	a	marker	for	time	through	the	differentiation	between	a	“pre”	and	
“post”	9/11	world.	As	officials	and	experts	frame	9/11	as	a	new	beginning,	they	participate	in	the	
transformation	of	9/11	into	a	marker	of	imperial	temporality	framed	as	the	beginning	of	a	“new”	
era	dictated	by	threats	and	crises	that	Afghanistan	and	its	people	pose.		
	 As	they	mapped	the	figure	of	“the	terrorist”	into	the	imaginative	geography	of	Afghanistan,	
officials	represent	and	project	the	blame	for	the	“horror”	and	“tragedy”	of	9/11	onto	Afghanistan.	In	
his	2009	speech,	Obama	framed	the	U.S.	experience	in	Afghanistan	as	one	of	sacrifice,	stating	that	
“nearly	700	Americans	have	lost	their	lives”	and	“troops	from	over	20	countries	have	also	paid	the	
ultimate	price.”231	In	2014,	he	reframed	the	U.S.	experience	in	Afghanistan	as	“progress”	at	a	“heavy	
price”	since	“2,200	American	patriots	who	have	made	the	ultimate	sacrifice,	that	last,	full	measure	
 
227	See	Lean,	The	Islamophobia	Industry.  
228	Jackson,	Writing	the	war	on	terrorism,	31.		
229	Jackson,	Writing	the	war	on	terrorism	;	Gregory,	The	Colonial	Present,	13.	U.S.	officials	went	so	far	as	to	frame	the	
“Enduring	Strategic	Partnership	Agreement”	as	symbolic	because	it	was	signed	on	the	first	anniversary	of	the	
assassination	of	Osama	bin	Laden.	
230	See	the	9/11	Memorial	Museum	website	(https://www.911memorial.org/visit/museum).	On	the	website,	visitors	are	
said	to	have	an	“unforgettable	encounter	with	the	story	of	their	attacks,	their	aftermath,	and	the	people	who	experienced	
these	events.”	
231	The	White	House	of	President	Barack	Obama,	“Remarks	by	the	President	on	a	New	Strategy	for	Afghanistan	and	
Pakistan.”	He	also	reiterated	that	the	U.S.	“did	not	choose	to	fight	a	war	in	Afghanistan”	but	resulted	directly	from	“9/11,”	
where	“nearly	3,000	of	our	people	were	killed	…	for	doing	nothing	more	than	going	about	their	daily	lives.”	
	
 57	
of	devotion,	right	here	in	Afghanistan.”232	Both	Trump	and	Pompeo	have	continued	to	weaponize	
the	memory	of	9/11	and	frame	Afghanistan	as	a	site	of	“American	sacrifice.”	In	his	“Afghanistan	and	
South	Asia	Strategy”	speech	where	Trump	claimed,		“nobody	can	forget	the	horrors	of	9/11”	and	
that	“9/11,	the	worst	terrorist	attack	in	our	history,	was	planned	and	directed	from	Afghanistan.”233	
Framed	as	the	source	of	U.S.	victimhood	and	national	trauma,	policy-makers	can	weaponize	the	U.S.	
national	identification	in	service	of	perpetual	war	and	interventionism	in	Afghanistan.		
	 These	documents	also	bespeak	how	U.S.	Presidents	and	members	of	their	administrations	
construct	an	increasingly	masculinist	and	militarized	national	identification	represented	by	the	
figure	of	the	“American	soldier.”234	As	they	continue	to	represent	Afghanistan	as	solely	
“responsible”	for	the	events	of	9/11,	officials	simultaneously	represent	the	figure	of	the	“American	
soldier”	as	the	embodiment	of	the	ultimate	“good.”	In	countless	documents,	these	officials	refer	to	
U.S.	soldiers	as	“brave	Americans”	who	have	sacrificed	themselves	“to	protect	U.S.	and	allied	
citizens	–	including	those	in	the	Hague	–	and	to	give	the	Afghan	people	a	chance	at	a	better	life.”235	
Presidents	give	elaborate	speeches	at	military	bases	and	represent	soldiers	as	the	epitome	of	the	
“American	nation.”	Policy-makers	advise	U.S.	citizens,	framed	as	a	unified	”the	American	people,”	to	
look	to	soldiers	for	“inspiration”	as	they	are	represented	as	the	embodiment	of	“the	best	that	our	
country	has	to	offer	–	the	virtues	that	have	made	America	great	for	more	than	two	centuries,	and	
the	values	that	will	keep	us	great	for	centuries	to	come.”236	Soldiers	are	represented	as	a	“fierce	
brotherhood	of	firefighters”	and	the	epitome	of	“the	bravery	and	generosity	of	ordinary	citizens.”237	
Trump	himself	called	U.S.	soldiers	“the	special	class	of	heroes	whose	selflessness,	courage,	and	
 
232	The	White	House	of	President	Barack	Obama,	“Remarks	by	the	President	to	the	Troops	at	Bagram	Air	Base,	
Afghanistan.”		
233	The	Trump	White	House,	“Remarks	by	President	Trump	on	the	Strategy	in	Afghanistan	and	South	Asia.”		
234	Rose,	The	Question	of	Zion.	
235	The	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“Secretary	Michael	R.	Pompeo	At	a	Press	Availability	with	Secretary	of	Defense	Mark	
Esper,	Attorney	General	William	Barr,	and	National	Security	Advisor	Robert	O’Brien.”			
236	The	White	House	of	Barack	Obama,	“Remarks	by	the	President	to	the	Troops	at	Fort	Bliss,	TX.”			
237	The	White	House	of	President	George	W.	Bush	Jr.,	“President	Delivers	State	of	the	Union	Address.”	 	
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resolve	[that]	is	unmatched	in	human	history.”238	Through	the	glorification	of	the	figure	of	the	
soldier,	governmental	personnel	continue	to	reinforce	not	only	the	construction	of	imperial	
relations,	but	the	consolidation	of	the	nation	as	well	as	the	production	of	U.S.	citizens	as	complicit	in	
U.S.	imperial	world-making.					
	 The	documents	also	expose	how	policy-makers	expand	the	glorification	of	the	figure	of	the	
“American	soldier”	and	frame	the	U.S.	as	a	successful,	powerful	force	of	good	throughout	the	world.	
They	continually	frame	the	“greatness”	of	the	U.S.	in	terms	of	representations	of		“progress”	and	
“victory”	in	Afghanistan.	In	order	for	the	imperial	state	to	construct	and	pursue	these	projects	of	
empire-building	“ordinary	people	must	accept	that	these	actions	better	the	world,	uplift	a	broken	or	
downtrodden	population,	or	spread	positive	values	like	democracy.”	239	The	Bush,	Obama,	and	
Trump	administrations	have	consistently	framed	U.S.	militarism	as	part	of	conflicts	that	the	U.S.	
would	eventually	“win.”240	On	July	4th,	Trump	gave	a	speech	in	South	Dakota	in	front	of	Mount	
Rushmore	where	he	represented	the	U.S.	citizen	as	part	of	“the	most	magnificent	country	in	the	
history	of	the	world.”	He	framed	the	U.S.	as	exceptional	in	comparison	to	every	other	nation,	stating	
that	“no	nation	has	done	more	to	advance	the	human	condition”	and	“no	people	have	done	more	to	
promote	human	progress	than	the	citizens	of	our	great	nation.”241	Leaders	frame	the	U.S.-
Afghanistan	relationship	through	“victory,”	“progress,”	and	“greatness”	narratives	and	discursively	
tie	“Afghanistan”	to	the	public	imagination	surrounding	“9/11.”	242	Citizens	come	to	see	and	
understand	U.S.-Afghan	relations	as	a	relationship	built	on	a	combination	of		“American	
sacrifice/victimhood”	and	“American	greatness.”	Afghanistan	becomes	a	site	of	complex	U.S.	
 
238	The	Trump	White	House,	“Remarks	by	President	Trump	on	the	Strategy	in	Afghanistan	and	South	Asia.”		
239	Kazi,	Islamophobia,	Race,	and	Global	Politics,	90.		
240	The	Trump	White	House,	“Remarks	by	President	Trump	on	the	Strategy	in	Afghanistan	and	South	Asia”	;	The	White	
House	of	President	George	W.	Bush	Jr.,	“Rebuilding	Afghanistan”;	The	White	House	of	President	Barack	Obama,	“Remarks	
of	President	Barack	Obama.”		
241	The	Trump	White	House,	“Remarks	by	President	Trump	at	South	Dakota’s	2020	Mount	Rushmore	Fireworks	
Celebration	|	Keystone,	South	Dakota.”		
242	See	Minh-ha,	Lovecidal,	for	a	more	in-depth	analysis	of	the	discourse	of	“American	Victory”	(37-41	and	123-130)	and	
Campbell,	Writing	Security	for	more	on	use	of	foreign	policy	to	frame	neocolonial	projects	as	“conquest”	and	
“intervention”	that	represent	national	strength	and	international	progress	(165).		
	
 59	
wounded	identity	and	a	place	that	U.S.	citizens	see	and	understand	as	“underserving”	of	grief	and	
care.243	
	 Foreign	policy	documents	uncover	how	representatives	of	the	U.S.	state	weaponize	the	idea	
of	a	national	identification	rooted	in	wounded	attachments	to	constructed	national	tragedies,	like	
9/11,	and	an	inflated	sense	of	national	self.	Through	these	documents,	officials	frame	Afghanistan	
as	distinctly	different,	a	site	of	threat	to	the	fabric	of	U.S.	society,	identity	and	economic,	political	and	
social	survival.	The	result	of	discourses	of	danger	and	national	sacrifice	is	the	production	of	
ressentiment,	defined	by	Pankaj	Mishra	as	the	mixture	of	envy,	powerlessness	and	humiliation	that	
fuels	militant	patriotism.244	In	the	documents,	officials	enshrine	the	representation	of	the	
relationship	between	the	U.S.	and	Afghanistan	as	defined	by	both	the	idea	of	“American	sacrifice”	
and	“American	greatness.”	As	a	result,	they	construct	and	reproduce	natural	hierarchies	of	systems	
of	classification	and	differentiation	that	produce	U.S.	citizens	as	complicit	in	the	disregard	for	the	
lives	of	those	affected	by	U.S.	imperial	violence.	The	internalization	of	systems	of	differentiation	and	
the	production	of	citizen-perpetrators	becomes	increasingly	evident	when	one	looks	at	how	
documents	and	archives	framed	as	“criticism”	recycle	the	same	representations	and	themes	as	U.S.	
official	discourse.			
	
	 	 	
“A	Staggering,	Costly	Failure”	:	SIGAR,	the	Afghan	Papers,	and	Complicit	Criticism		
	 	
	
	 The	success	of	the	indoctrination	of	U.S.	citizens	into	the	role	of	citizen-perpetrator	can	be	
seen	in	what	is	framed	as	“criticism”	of	U.S.	actions	in	Afghanistan.	Azoulay	argues	that	criticism	
based	on	systems	of	classification	and	differentiation	rooted	in	the	distinction	between	citizen	and	
non-citizen	facilitates	the	production	of	citizen-perpetrators	who	“conceive	of	themselves	in	a	
 
243 Brown,	“Wounded	Attachments	and	Stanley,	How	Fascism	Works,	Chapter	6	“Victimhood,”	93-108. 
244	Mishra,	The	Age	of	Anger.	
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differentiated,	not	shared,	world.”245	Officials	and	critics	alike	often	describe	The	Office	of	the	
Special	Inspector	General	for	Afghanistan	Reconstruction	(SIGAR)	as	a	source	of	critique	for	U.S.	
efforts	in	Afghanistan.	According	to	official	documents,	SIGAR	was	established	by	presidential	order	
in	2008,	as	a	third	party,	independent	“watchdog”	organization	to	monitor	and	report	on	U.S.	
activities	in	Afghanistan.	SIGAR	has	a	vast	online	archive	of	reports	and	documents	divided	into	
sections	and	sub-categories	of	differentiation.	The	SIGAR	archive	has	all	reports	organized	into	
different	tabs	and	archived	for	online	viewers	to	peruse.	SIGAR	launched	a	“Lessons	Learned	
Project”	(LLP)	in	2014	that	has	produced	eleven	different	reports	centered	on	imperial	language,	
such	as	“Counternarcotics,”	“Support	for	Gender	Equality,”	“Corruption	in	Conflict,”	and	
“Stabilization.”246	Throughout	the	eleven	official	reports,	SIGAR	agents	continually	regurgitate	
political	devices	and	representations,	such	as	“reconstruction”	and	the	representation	of	the	Afghan	
state	as	“weak”	and	“corrupt.”	Under	the	tab	“Special	Projects,”	SIGAR	holds	a	library	of	“fact	sheets”	
that	frame	the	“facts”	about	U.S.	actions	and	relations	with	Afghanistan.	The	archive	of	SIGAR	
represents	another	threshold	that	reproduces	the	archival	taxonomy	of	the	U.S.	imperial	state.		
	 Ultimately,	SIGAR	documents	contain	the	same	political	devices	and	imperial	rhetoric	as	
those	in	documents	found	in	foreign	policy	archives.	SIGAR	agents	discursively	connect	U.S.	actions	
in	Afghanistan	to	the	idea	of	imperial	learning.	Policy-makers	who	draft	SIGAR	reports	continue	to	
frame	U.S.	involvement	as	“inefficient”	or	a	result	of	“poor	planning	and	execution”	rather	than	
imperial	world-building.	In	SIGAR’s	High-Risk	List	Report	from	2016,	SIGAR	agents	continued	to	
represent	the	idea	of	“American	sacrifice”	as	the	“high	costs”	of	“reconstruction”	efforts.	They	frame	
SIGAR	as	an	organization	for	the	protection	of	the	“enormous	investment	that	American	taxpayers	
have	made	in	Afghanistan.”247	They	also	represent	the	LLP	program	as	an	effort	to	“preserve	
lessons	from	the	U.S.	reconstruction	experience	in	Afghanistan,	and	to	make	recommendations	to	
 
245	Azoulay,	Potential	History,	272.		
246	See	reports	in	the	SIGAR	“Lessons	Learned	Reports”	archive.		
247	116th	Congress,	“Inspector	General	For	Afghanistan	Reconstruction’s	2019	High-Risk	List,”	4.	
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Congress	and	executive	agencies	on	ways	to	improve	our	efforts	in	current	and	future	
operations.”248	In	SIGAR’s	2020	High-Risk	List,	SIGAR	agents	continue	to	forward	the	
representation	of	U.S.	interventionism	as	incomplete	and	necessary	due	to	what	they	frame	as	eight	
“high-risk	areas.”249	Therefore,	SIGAR	functions	as	a	form	of	complicit	criticism	that	furthers	the	
normalization	of	U.S.	imperial	violence	as	a	socially	acceptable	“object	of	history.”250	SIGAR	agents	
center	their	reports	on	“recommendations”	based	on	the	idea	of		“improving”	the	balance	of	U.S.	
empire-building	to	avoid	imperial	strain	without	sacrificing	imperial	benefit.	These	documents	
reveal	how	forms	of	critique,	especially	those	that	stem	from	within	the	imperial	state,	continue	to	
(re)make	imperial	ambition	as	adaptable	to	the	construction	and	maintenance	of	imperial	relations.			
Another	source	framed	as	criticism	is	the	Washington	Post’s	exposè	entitled	“The	Afghan	
Papers.”	In	2019,	the	Washington	Post	released	this	multi-part	exposé	comprised	of	over	600	
documents,	including	SIGAR	interviews	and	a	series	of	Donald	Rumsfeld’s	“Snowflake”	emails	
surrounding	U.S.	operations	in	Afghanistan	since	2001.	While	experts	and	media	outlets	often	
framed	the	exposé	as	an	overwhelming	critique	of	U.S.	aggression	and	militarism,	the	Washington	
Post	continues	to	recycle	imperial	terminology	and	differentiation	that	represent	Afghanistan	as	a	
site	of	imperial	learning.	All	611	interviews	and	documents	are	housed	on	a	single	online	database	
and	grouped	according	to	six	“story	topics”:	“Spin,”	“Strategy,”	“Corruption,”	“Nation-Building,”	
“Security	Forces,”	and	“Opium.”251	The	documents	indicate	that	the	architects	of	U.S.	
interventionism,	such	as	policy-makers,	military	and	government	officials	and	aid	workers,	framed	
their	criticism	around	the	idea	of	inefficiency,	lack	of	coordination,	poor	planning,	and	reliance	on	a	
 
248	SIGAR,	“Lessons	Learned	Program.”	The	official	mission	statement	reads:	“the	goal	of	the	program	is	to	improve	the	
effectiveness,	efficiency,	and	sustainability	of	current	and	future	reconstruction	efforts	through	comprehensive,	evidence-
based	analysis	of	the	U.S.	engagement	in	Afghanistan	since	2001.	Our	reports	show	what	has	and	has	not	worked	over	the	
course	of	the	U.S.	reconstruction	experience.	They	offer	detailed	and	actionable	recommendations	to	policy-makers	and	
respond	to	the	needs	of	U.S.	implementing	agencies—both	in	terms	of	accurately	capturing	their	efforts	and	providing	
timely	and	actionable	guidance	for	future	efforts.”	
249	SIGAR,	“High	Risk	List.”	The	interactive	report	highlights	eight	“high	risk”	areas	are:	“the	capability	and	capacity	of	
Afghan	security	forces”,	“corruption	in	the	Afghan	government”,	“sustainability”,	“counternarcotics”,	“reduction	of	U.S.	
control”,	and	visibility	over	“reconstruction”	funds,	“oversight”,	and	“planning	and	strategy”.		
250	Azoulay,	Potential	History,	563.  
251	Whitlock,	Shapiro,	and	Emamdjomeh,	“The	Afghanistan	Papers.”		
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rotation	of	“experts”	faulted	only	for	being	“ignorant”	about	Afghanistan	society	and	politics.	They	
also	continually	referred	to	U.S.	actions	as	part	of	ongoing	projects	of	“reconstruction”	or	part	of	the	
U.S.’s	“economic	investment”	in	Afghanistan.	These	critiques	do	not	expose	or	outline	the	imperial	
crimes	of	the	U.S.,	they	simply	reproduce	the	idea	that	criticism	of	U.S.	actions	in	Afghanistan	pivot	
around	the	idea	of	“inefficient”	and	“incompetent”	U.S.	imperial	world-building	in	Afghanistan	that	
could	be	improved	rather	than	challenged.		
The	documents	in	supposedly	critical	archives	showcase	how	authors	often	recenter	the	
idea	of	“critique”	of	the	relationship	between	the	U.S.	and	Afghanistan	around	the	U.S.	experience	
rather	than	elevating	the	voices	of	Afghan	people	that	have	been	left	out	and	excluded	from	the	
archive.	The	authors	of	the	Washington	Post	exposé	had	the	potential	to	include	criticism	from	local	
voices,	especially	those	from	marginalized	communities	most	affected	by	U.S.	violence.	Local	critics,	
such	as	Zarlasht	Halaimzai,	the	Director	of	the	Refugee	Trauma	Initiative,	continue	to	vocalize	their	
concerns	regarding	U.S.	militarism	and	so-called	“humanitarian”	intentions	that	have	little	to	no	
consideration	for	“the	unimaginable	suffering	to	Afghan	and	American	families.”252	Yet	these	voices	
were	again	left	out	of	both	official	and	critical	archives.	Instead,	23	out	of	25	of	the	“25	essential	
documents	from	the	Afghanistan	Papers”	were	from	the	U.S.	and	U.S.-led	NATO	and	22	were	male.	
Only	two	interviewees	were	local	Afghans,	former	official	Mohammed	Ehsan	Zia	and	former	
governor	Tooryalai	Wesa.253	Wesa	centered	his	critique	around	U.S.	official’s	pursuit	of	social	
programming	in	Afghanistan	with	little	to	no	consultation	with	local	officials	or	Afghans.	For	
example,	he	stated	that	U.S.	officials	concocted	programs	to	teach	locals	how	to	wash	their	hands,	
which	was	incredibly	insulting	given	that	locals	wash	their	hands	five	times	a	day	for	prayers.254	
Despite	the	complicit	dimensions	of	the	Washington	Post	exposé,	U.S.	leadership	continues	to	
trivialize	any	form	of	critique	of	U.S.	interventionism	or	imperial	violence.	Defense	Official	Mark	
 
252	Halaimzai,	“The	United	States’	fatal	flaw	in	Afghanistan?	Excluding	Afghans.”		
253	Whitlock	and	Rindler,	“25	essential	documents	from	the	Afghanistan	Papers.”		
254	Wesa,	“Lessons	Learned	Interview.”			
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Cancian	and	defense	policy	expert	James	Carafano	both	framed	the	exposé	as	inconsequential,	and	
they	reiterated	that	the	Pentagon	would	not	change	their	policies	despite	the	release	and	
dissemination	of	the	exposé.	The	inclusion	of	those	most	affected	by	U.S.	violence	could	have	served	
to	expose	U.S.	militarism	in	Afghanistan	rather	than	reinforce	the	discursive	representation	of	elite	
U.S.	“experts”	and	military	forces	as	the	voices	of	both	“expertise”	and	“criticism.”	
At	a	joint	news	conference	with	the	Australian	Prime	Minister,	Trump	claimed	that	his	
administration	could	end	what	he	framed	as	“the	war”	“very	quickly”	except	“many,	many,	really,	
tens	of	millions	of	people	would	get	killed,	and	we	think	it’s	unnecessary.”255	By	framing	the	deaths	
of	millions	of	Afghan	people	as	“doable”	but	“unnecessary,”	Trump	represents	the	continuation	of	
mass	moral	disengagement	and	disregard	for	the	lives	of	those	affected	by	U.S.	empire-building.	
Through	these	documents,	policy-makers	and	complicit	critics	facilitate	the	production	of	a	
“banality	of	evil”	that	renders	violence	against	Afghans	and	the	reproduction	of	the	imperial	
condition	socially	acceptable.256	Therefore,	foreign	policy	documents	are	not	just	words	or	
“policies”	that	can	be	recorded,	stored,	and	forgotten	in	various	archives	–	they	are	intimately	tied	
to	violence,	discrimination,	and	prejudice	that	has	devastating	effects	on	the	lives	of	areas,	groups,	
and	people	that	Presidents	and	members	of	their	administrations	wish	to	dominate	and	control.		
Since	no	colonizing	power	colonizes	innocently,	representatives	of	the	state,	policy-makers,	
complicit	critics,	and	citizen-perpetrators	are	dehumanizing	themselves	through	concerted	efforts	to	
destroy	worlds,	dictate	international	politics,	and	construct	relations	between	peoples	based	on	
“domination	and	submission.”257	From	these	documents,	we	can	see	that	official	documents,	
narratives,	and	forms	of	liberal	critique	will	not	produce	an	anti-imperial	revolution	“for	the	
 
255	Wagner,	“Trump	says	he	could	end	Afghanistan	war	quickly	but	‘tens	of	millions’	of	people	would	die.”		
256	Waller,	Becoming	Evil,	98-106	and	174-176.		
257	Cèsaire,	Discourse	on	Colonialism,	5-6.	See	also	Fanon,	The	Wretched	of	the	Earth	and	Black	Skin,	White	Masks.	Here,	
Fanon	discusses	how	colonial	violence	produces	neuroses	and	a	“sick	society”	that	relies	on	the	(re)production	of	
racialized	“delirious	Manichaeism”	that	constructs	“white”	and	“black”	as	situated,	hierarchical	categories	that	order	
society	and	produces	inferiority	complexes	and	psychological	neuroses	(See	Fanon,	The	Wretched	of	the	Earth,	47-50	and	
Black	Skin,	White	Masks,	160	and	180).		
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Master’s	tools	will	never	dismantle	the	Master’s	house.”258	Therefore,	the	time	is	now	to	look	
elsewhere	and	begin	the	shared	labor	of	reparations	and	repair	necessary	to	open	the	door	to	the	
possibility	of	an	anti-imperial	condition.		 	
 
258	Azoulay,	Potential	History,	31	(quoting	Audre	Lorde).		
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CONCLUSION	
	
The	unbearable	imperial	condition	cannot	be	changed	with	this	destructive	call	for	the	impossible	in	
the	form	of	a	new	beginning	…	instead,	it	is	the	threshold	of	unbearability	that	should	be	restored	and	
used	in	order	to	cry	out,	“not	everything	should	be	possible!”		
Ariella	Aïsha	Azoulay,	Potential	History:	Unlearning	Imperialism	(2019),	pgs.	55-56	
	
	
	 Imperial	violence	is	our	shared	commons	and	therefore	“all	imperial	crimes	are	surely	the	
common	inheritance	of	humanity.”259	U.S.	foreign	policy	documents	expose	how	this	imperial	
condition	we	live	in	is	constructed	and	maintained	through	the	production	of	regime-made	
disasters,	the	establishment	of	unequal	relations	between	states,	pointillistic	empire-balancing,	
militarized	patriotism,	and	ultimately	socialized	complicity.	The	documents	within	foreign	policy	
archives	reveal	how	heads	of	state	and	their	personnel	mask	the	movement	towards	non-public	
and	more	covert	forms	of	“occupation	lite”260	in	Afghanistan	through	discourses	of	danger,	systems	
of	differentiation,	and	political	devices	that	represent	violence,	interventionism,	exploitation,	and	
impunity	as	socially	and	internationally	acceptable.	These	documents	are	then	nestled	into	archives	
where	violence	and	violation	become	part	of	a	constructed	“past”	rather	than	ongoing	and	
perpetual	imperial	enterprise.		As	citizen-perpetrators	increasingly	accept	and	internalize	the	
neutrality	of	these	archives,	the	imperial	world	order	is	reaffirmed	and	increasingly	“dispossessed	
of	tenderness	and	love.”261	
	 Imperial	actors	and	the	citizen-perpetrators	they	reproduce	emerge	from	the	colonial	
matrix	of	power	designed	to	reproduce	racialized	social	categorization	according	to	Eurocentric	
norms	and	the	unequal	international	division	of	labor.262	Hence,	those	integrated	into	societies	with	
 
259	Azoulay,	Potential	History,	152.	
260	Minh-ha,	Lovecidal,	25	and	46.		
261	Ibid,	154.			
262	Quijano,	“COLONIALITY	AND	MODERNITY/RATIONALITY,”	168-171	;	Escobar,	“Beyond	the	Third	World:	imperial	
globality,	global	coloniality	and	anti-globalisation	social	movements,”	211	and	217	‘	Mignolo,	“Geopolitics	of	sensing	and	
knowing:	on	(de)coloniality,	border	thinking,	and	epistemic	disobedience,”	278.	See	also	Maldonado-Torres	“ON	THE	
COLONIALITY	OF	BEING.”	Maldonado-Torres	states	that	the	coloniality	of	being	is	characterized	by	“permanent	
suspicion”	which	emerged	from	European	colonization	and	became	the	foundation	of	European	identity	[ego	conquiro]	
(244.)	
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colonial	legacies	and	socialized	in	imperialist	epistemologies	can	start	the	shared	labor	of	
reparation	through	the	interruption	of	the	production	of	themselves	as	citizen-perpetrators	and	an	
open	refusal	to	remain	complicit	in	the	violence	of	the	U.S.	imperial	state	and	the	imperial	condition	
as	a	whole.	Both	victims	and	perpetrators	are	needed	to	begin	the	process	of	recovery	for	the	
human	condition	and	the	end	of	imperial	forms	of	domination	and	exploitation.263	This	involves	
perpetrators	and	those	who	benefit	from	systems	of	differentiation	that	insulate	them	from	
imperial	state	violence	to	engage	in	deep	and	difficult	reflection	and	the	assume	of	“responsibility	
for	not	letting	the	perpetrator	vanish."264	
	 This	project,	then,	is	a	commitment	to	an	anti-imperial	project	that	is	both	intellectual	and	
political	and	an	ongoing	effort	to	reclaim	the	right	to	not	be	a	perpetrator	of	U.S.	imperial	
violence.265	It	is	both	a	piece	of	scholarly	work	and	an	inherently	political	statement	that	rejects	
official	discourses	that	claim	to	speak	and	act	“for	the	nation”	and	“the	American	people.”	This	
project	suggests	the	potentially	transformative	power	in	active	and	open	rejection	of	U.S.	imperial	
discourses	and	political	devices	that	representative	of	the	U.S.	state	weaponize	to	perpetuate	U.S.	
imperial	world-building.	Derek	Gregory	issues	a	warning:	“insofar	as	we	[U.S.	citizens]	assent	to	
them,	often	by	our	silence,	then	we	are	complicit	in	what	is	done	in	our	collective	name.”266	U.S.	
citizens	can	seize	this	moment	as	an	opportunity	to	firmly	establish	a	threshold	of	unbearability	to	
continued	violence	by	the	U.S.	state	in	their	name.267	They	can	disavow	their	privileges	and	go	on	
strike	until	the	U.S.	acknowledges	imperial	crimes	and	begins	to	engage	in	the	labor	of	reparations.		
	
The	recovery	of	the	human	condition	is	always	possible,	for	“justice,	reparations,	redress	of	the	
world	can	never	be	too	late.”268	 	
 
263	Azoulay,	Potential	History	148.	
264	Ibid,	518.		
265	Gregory,	The	Colonial	Present,	7-9.	
266	Azoulay,	Potential	History,	28-29.		
267	Ibid,	55-56.		
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